Re: [PATCH v2] Bluetooth: fix use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested()
From: Wangshaobo (bobo) <hidden>
Date: 2021-07-19 09:04:05
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lkml, netdev
在 2021/7/19 15:48, Hillf Danton 写道:
quoted hunk
On Mon, 19 Jul 2021 10:49:37 +0800 Wang ShaoBo wrote:quoted
use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested is reported:There are similar reports from syzbot. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000f335f205b5649c70@google.com/ (local) [2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000c4fd0405b6cc8e53@google.com/ (local)quoted
[ 179.140137][ T3731] ===================================================== [ 179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0 [ 179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #54 [ 179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace: [ 179.153301][ T3731] dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0 [ 179.154063][ T3731] kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0 [ 179.154855][ T3731] __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0 [ 179.155579][ T3731] lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0 [ 179.156436][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.157257][ T3731] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890 [ 179.158154][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20 [ 179.159141][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.159994][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0 [ 179.160959][ T3731] ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420 [ 179.161834][ T3731] l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50 [ 179.162608][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.163435][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0 [ 179.164406][ T3731] l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050 [ 179.165189][ T3731] ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70 [ 179.166180][ T3731] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590 [ 179.167066][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20 [ 179.168023][ T3731] ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560 [ 179.168818][ T3731] process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0 [ 179.169598][ T3731] worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370 [ 179.170346][ T3731] kthread+0x4ef/0x610 [ 179.171010][ T3731] ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0 [ 179.171828][ T3731] ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110 [ 179.172587][ T3731] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 179.173348][ T3731] [ 179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at: [ 179.174409][ T3731] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0 [ 179.175373][ T3731] kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0 [ 179.176060][ T3731] kfree+0x3a5/0x1180 [ 179.176664][ T3731] __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80 [ 179.177375][ T3731] __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0 [ 179.178032][ T3731] sk_free+0x97/0x130 [ 179.178686][ T3731] l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0 [ 179.179457][ T3731] sock_close+0x150/0x450 [ 179.180117][ T3731] __fput+0x6bd/0xf00 [ 179.180787][ T3731] ____fput+0x37/0x40 [ 179.181481][ T3731] task_work_run+0x140/0x280 [ 179.182219][ T3731] do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60 [ 179.182930][ T3731] do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450 [ 179.183656][ T3731] get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0 [ 179.184344][ T3731] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10 [ 179.185266][ T3731] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560 [ 179.186136][ T3731] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60 [ 179.186984][ T3731] do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140 [ 179.187681][ T3731] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 179.188604][ T3731] ===================================================== In our case, there are two Thread A and B: Context: Thread A: Context: Thread B: l2cap_chan_timeout() __se_sys_shutdown() l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_shutdown() l2cap_chan_del() l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED, and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C: Context: Thread C: sock_close() l2cap_sock_release() sock_orphan() l2cap_sock_kill() #free sock if refcnt is 1 If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again, use-after-free happened. We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is destructed, for telling teardown operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we shouldAlternatively ensure it is safe to invoke the teardown cb by holding extra grab to sock, see diff below,quoted
avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb().with an eye on double kill.quoted
Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <redacted> --- v2: put chan->data = NULL in l2cap_socl_destruct(), this refers to Luiz Augusto von Dentz [off-list ref]'s proposal. --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index c99d65ef13b1..160c016a5dfb 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c@@ -1508,6 +1508,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_close_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan){ struct sock *sk = chan->data; + if (!sk) + return; + l2cap_sock_kill(sk); }@@ -1516,6 +1519,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)struct sock *sk = chan->data; struct sock *parent; + if (!sk) + return; + BT_DBG("chan %p state %s", chan, state_to_string(chan->state)); /* This callback can be called both for server (BT_LISTEN)@@ -1707,8 +1713,10 @@ static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk){ BT_DBG("sk %p", sk); - if (l2cap_pi(sk)->chan) + if (l2cap_pi(sk)->chan) { + l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->data = NULL; l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan); + } if (l2cap_pi(sk)->rx_busy_skb) { kfree_skb(l2cap_pi(sk)->rx_busy_skb); -- 2.27.0Hold sock until it is killed to make l2cap callbacks safe. Now only for thoughts.+++ x/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c@@ -1509,6 +1509,8 @@ static void l2cap_sock_close_cb(struct l struct sock *sk = chan->data; l2cap_sock_kill(sk); + /* put the extra hold in l2cap_sock_init() */ + sock_put(sk); } static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)@@ -1794,6 +1796,8 @@ static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock /* Default config options */ chan->flush_to = L2CAP_DEFAULT_FLUSH_TO; + /* will be put in l2cap_sock_close_cb() */ + sock_hold(sk); chan->data = sk; chan->ops = &l2cap_chan_ops; }.
Dear Danton, I have tried this before, this will trigger error "underflow of refcount of chan" as following: [ 118.708179][ T3086] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 118.710172][ T3086] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 118.713391][ T3086] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 3086 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x30a/0x3c0 [ 118.716774][ T3086] Modules linked in: [ 118.718279][ T3086] CPU: 4 PID: 3086 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #84 [ 118.721005][ T3086] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 118.722846][ T3086] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 118.723786][ T3086] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x30a/0x3c0 ... [ 118.737912][ T3086] CR2: 0000000020000040 CR3: 0000000011029000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 118.739187][ T3086] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 118.740451][ T3086] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 118.741720][ T3086] Call Trace: [ 118.742262][ T3086] l2cap_sock_close_cb+0x165/0x170 [ 118.743124][ T3086] ? l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0x560/0x560 Actually, if adding sock_hold(sk) in l2cap_sock_init(), l2cap_sock_kill() will continue to excute untill it found now chan's refcount is 0, this is because sock was not freed in last round execution of l2cap_sock_kill(). this method also makes l2cap_sock_init()'s logic more difficult to understand, we have set refcount of sock to 1 when allocating it, why do we need hold it again ? -- Wang ShaoBo