Thread (7 messages) flat view 7 messages, 5 authors, 2017-06-12

Re: [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important

From: Emil Lenngren <hidden>
Date: 2017-06-11 21:30:38
Also in: keyrings, linux-nfs, linux-wireless, lkml, netdev

2017-06-11 22:48 GMT+02:00 Emmanuel Grumbach [off-list ref]:
On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 4:36 PM, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Sun, Jun 11, 2017 at 1:13 AM, Kalle Valo [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
"Jason A. Donenfeld" [off-list ref] writes:
quoted
Whenever you're comparing two MACs, it's important to do this using
crypto_memneq instead of memcmp. With memcmp, you leak timing information,
which could then be used to iteratively forge a MAC.
Do you have any pointers where I could learn more about this?
While not using C specifically, this talks about the problem generally:
https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/articles/beginners-guide-constant-time-cryptography.html
Sorry for the stupid question, but the MAC address is in plaintext in
the air anyway or easily accessible via user space tools. I fail to
see what it is so secret about a MAC address in that code where that
same MAC address is accessible via myriads of ways.
I think you're mixing up Media Access Control (MAC) addresses with
Message Authentication Code (MAC). The second one is a cryptographic
signature of a message.
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread
kprevious message in thread
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help