[bluetooth-next 01/13] Bluetooth: Add support for SMP phase 3 (key distribution)
From: Vinicius Costa Gomes <hidden>
Date: 2011-06-07 22:50:02
Subsystem:
bluetooth subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Marcel Holtmann, Luiz Augusto von Dentz, Linus Torvalds
This adds support for generating and distributing all the keys specified in the third phase of SMP. This will make possible to re-establish secure connections, resolve private addresses and sign commands. For now, the values generated are random. Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <redacted> --- include/net/bluetooth/smp.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 1 + net/bluetooth/smp.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index 4fb7d19..46c4576 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h@@ -118,5 +118,6 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req { /* SMP Commands */ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level); int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb); +int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force); #endif /* __SMP_H */
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 9db461d..f202fa3 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c@@ -4193,6 +4193,7 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt) chan->sec_level = hcon->sec_level; del_timer(&conn->security_timer); l2cap_chan_ready(sk); + smp_distribute_keys(conn, 0); } bh_unlock_sock(sk);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 3822159..c9ae5d4 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c@@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, cmd->io_capability = SMP_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT; cmd->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; cmd->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE; - cmd->init_key_dist = 0x00; - cmd->resp_key_dist = 0x00; + cmd->init_key_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; + cmd->resp_key_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; cmd->auth_req = authreq; }
@@ -462,6 +462,26 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level) return 0; } +static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + /* FIXME: store the ltk */ + return 0; +} + +static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing *paircmd = (void *) &conn->prsp[1]; + u8 keydist = paircmd->init_key_dist; + + BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", keydist); + /* FIXME: store ediv and rand */ + + smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1); + + return 0; +} + int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { __u8 code = skb->data[0];
@@ -503,10 +523,20 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) break; case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO: + reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: + reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); + break; + case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO: case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: + /* Just ignored */ + reason = 0; + break; + default: BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
@@ -523,3 +553,83 @@ done: kfree_skb(skb); return err; } + +int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force) +{ + struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; + __u8 *keydist; + + BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force); + + if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm); + + rsp = (void *) &conn->prsp[1]; + + /* The responder sends its keys first */ + if (!force && conn->hcon->out && (rsp->resp_key_dist & 0x07)) + return 0; + + req = (void *) &conn->preq[1]; + + if (conn->hcon->out) { + keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; + *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; + } else { + keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist; + *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist; + } + + + BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist); + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { + struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; + struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; + __le16 ediv; + + get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); + get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); + get_random_bytes(ident.rand, sizeof(ident.rand)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); + + ident.ediv = cpu_to_le16(ediv); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; + } + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) { + struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; + struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; + + /* Send a dummy key */ + get_random_bytes(idinfo.irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); + + /* Just public address */ + memset(&addrinfo, 0, sizeof(addrinfo)); + bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, conn->src); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), + &addrinfo); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; + } + + if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { + struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; + + /* Send a dummy key */ + get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); + + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); + + *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; + } + + return 0; +}
--
1.7.5.4