@@ -1086,6 +1086,32 @@ VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT
 void arm_smmu_get_ste_update_safe(const __le64 *cur, const __le64 *target,
 				  __le64 *safe_bits)
 {
+	const __le64 eats_s1chk =
+		FIELD_PREP(STRTAB_STE_1_EATS, STRTAB_STE_1_EATS_S1CHK);
+	const __le64 eats_trans =
+		FIELD_PREP(STRTAB_STE_1_EATS, STRTAB_STE_1_EATS_TRANS);
+
+	/*
+	 * When an STE changes EATS_TRANS, the sequencing code in the attach
+	 * logic already will have the PCI cap for ATS disabled. Thus at this
+	 * moment we can expect that the device will not generate ATS queries
+	 * and so we don't care about the sequencing of EATS. The purpose of
+	 * EATS_TRANS is to protect the system from hostile untrusted devices
+	 * that issue ATS when the PCI config space is disabled. However, if
+	 * EATS_TRANS is being changed, then we must have already trusted the
+	 * device as the EATS_TRANS security block is being disabled.
+	 *
+	 *  Note: now the EATS_TRANS update is moved to the first entry_set().
+	 *  Changing S2S and EATS might transiently result in S2S=1 and EATS=1
+	 *  which is a bad STE (see "5.2 Stream Table Entry"). In such a case,
+	 *  we can't do a hitless update. Also, it should not be added to the
+	 *  safe bits with STRTAB_STE_1_EATS_S1CHK, because EATS=0b11 would be
+	 *  effectively an errant 0b00 configuration.
+	 */
+	if (!((cur[1] | target[1]) & cpu_to_le64(eats_s1chk)) &&
+	    !((cur[2] | target[2]) & cpu_to_le64(STRTAB_STE_2_S2S)))
+		safe_bits[1] |= cpu_to_le64(eats_trans);
+
 	/*
 	 * MEV does not meaningfully impact the operation of the HW, it only
 	 * changes how many fault events are generated, thus we can relax it