Re: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 5/7] coresight: tmc: Add support for reading tracedata from previous boot

quoted

On 09/11/2023 01:08, Linu Cherian wrote:
Hi James,

-----Original Message-----
From: Linu Cherian <redacted>
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2023 6:53 PM
To: James Clark <redacted>; suzuki.poulose@arm.com;
mike.leach@linaro.org; leo.yan@linaro.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; coresight@lists.linaro.org; linux-
kernel@vger.kernel.org; robh+dt@kernel.org;
krzysztof.kozlowski+dt@linaro.org; conor+dt@kernel.org;
devicetree@vger.kernel.org; Sunil Kovvuri Goutham
[off-list ref]; George Cherian [off-list ref]; Anil
Kumar Reddy H [off-list ref]
Subject: RE: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 5/7] coresight: tmc: Add support for reading
tracedata from previous boot

Hi James,

-----Original Message-----
From: James Clark <redacted>
Sent: Wednesday, October 4, 2023 7:18 PM
To: Linu Cherian <redacted>; suzuki.poulose@arm.com;
mike.leach@linaro.org; leo.yan@linaro.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; coresight@lists.linaro.org;
linux- kernel@vger.kernel.org; robh+dt@kernel.org;
krzysztof.kozlowski+dt@linaro.org; conor+dt@kernel.org;
devicetree@vger.kernel.org; Sunil Kovvuri Goutham
[off-list ref]; George Cherian [off-list ref]; Anil
Kumar Reddy H [off-list ref]; Tanmay Jagdale
[off-list ref]
Subject: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 5/7] coresight: tmc: Add support for reading
tracedata from previous boot

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On 03/10/2023 17:43, James Clark wrote:

On 29/09/2023 14:37, Linu Cherian wrote:
* Introduce a new mode CS_MODE_READ_PREVBOOT for reading
tracedata
  captured in previous boot.

* Add special handlers for preparing ETR/ETF for this special mode

* User can read the trace data as below

  For example, for reading trace data from tmc_etf sink

  1. cd /sys/bus/coresight/devices/tmc_etfXX/

  2. Change mode to READ_PREVBOOT

     #echo 1 > read_prevboot

  3. Dump trace buffer data to a file,

     #dd if=/dev/tmc_etrXX of=~/cstrace.bin

  4. Reset back to normal mode

     #echo 0 > read_prevboot

Signed-off-by: Anil Kumar Reddy <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Tanmay Jagdale <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Linu Cherian <redacted>
---
 .../coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c          |   1 +
 .../hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-core.c  |  81 +++++++++-
 .../hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etf.c   |  62 ++++++++
 .../hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c   | 145
+++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc.h   |   6 +
 include/linux/coresight.h                     |  13 ++
 6 files changed, 306 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
index 77b0271ce6eb..513baf681280 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
@@ -1010,6 +1010,7 @@ static void etm4_disable(struct
coresight_device *csdev,

 	switch (mode) {
 	case CS_MODE_DISABLED:
+	case CS_MODE_READ_PREVBOOT:
 		break;
 	case CS_MODE_SYSFS:
 		etm4_disable_sysfs(csdev);
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-core.c
b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-core.c
index 6658ce76777b..65c15c9f821b 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-core.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-core.c
@@ -103,6 +103,45 @@ u32 tmc_get_memwidth_mask(struct
tmc_drvdata *drvdata)
 	return mask;
 }

+int tmc_read_prepare_prevboot(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata) {
+	int ret = 0;
+	struct tmc_register_snapshot *reg_ptr;
+	struct coresight_device *csdev = drvdata->csdev;
+
+	if (!drvdata->metadata.vaddr) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	reg_ptr = drvdata->metadata.vaddr;
+	if (!reg_ptr->valid) {
+		dev_err(&drvdata->csdev->dev,
+			"Invalid metadata captured from previous boot\n");
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
I'm wondering if a more robust check is needed than the valid flag,
like a checksum or something. I didn't debug it yet but I ended up
with an invalid set of metadata after a panic reboot, see below. I'm
not sure if it's just a logic bug or something got lost during the
reboot, I didn't debug it yet. But I suppose unless you assume the
panic didn't affect writing the metadata, then it could be partially
written and shouldn't be trusted?

[...]
+
+static int tmc_etr_sync_prevboot_buf(struct tmc_drvdata *drvdata) {
+	u32 status;
+	u64 rrp, rwp, dba;
+	struct tmc_register_snapshot *reg_ptr;
+	struct etr_buf *etr_buf = drvdata->prevboot_buf;
+
+	reg_ptr = drvdata->metadata.vaddr;
+
+	rrp = reg_ptr->rrp;
+	rwp = reg_ptr->rwp;
+	dba = reg_ptr->dba;
+	status = reg_ptr->sts;
+
+	etr_buf->full = !!(status & TMC_STS_FULL);
+
+	/* Sync the buffer pointers */
+	etr_buf->offset = rrp - dba;
+	if (etr_buf->full)
+		etr_buf->len = etr_buf->size;
+	else
+		etr_buf->len = rwp - rrp;
+
+	/* Sanity checks for validating metadata */
+	if ((etr_buf->offset > etr_buf->size) ||
+	    (etr_buf->len > etr_buf->size))
+		return -EINVAL;
The values I got here are 0x781b67182aa346f9 0x8000000 0x8000000 for
offset, size and len respectively. This fails the first check. It
would also be nice to have a dev_dbg here as well, it's basically
the same as the valid check above which does have one.
So I debugged it and the issue is that after the panic I was doing a
cold boot rather than a warm boot and the memory was being randomised.

The reason that 0x8000000 seemed to be initialised is because they are
based on the reserved region size, rather than anything from the
metadata. When I examined the metadata it was all randomised.

That leads me to think that the single bit for 'valid' is insufficient.
There is a simple hashing function in include/linux/stringhash.h that
we could use on the whole metadata struct, but that specifically says:

 * These hash functions are NOT GUARANTEED STABLE between kernel
 * versions, architectures, or even repeated boots of the same kernel.
 * (E.g. they may depend on boot-time hardware detection or be
 * deliberately randomized.)

Although I'm not sure how true the repeated boots of the same kernel
part is.

Maybe something in include/crypto/hash.h could be used instead, or
make our own simple hash.
Thanks for the pointers. Will take a look at it.
Since the purpose is to identify any data corruption, crc32(using crc32_le API) looks okay to me. Any thoughts on this ?
May be we could add crc32 checks for trace data as well ?

Thanks.
Seems fine to me. Maybe doing it on the trace data is overkill if you
already know the metadata is fine, but at the same time it might not do
any harm either. It might catch some edge case where the firmware or
device is doing something strange.









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