Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] mm: Implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2022-10-28 18:51:12
Also in:
linux-mm, lkml
On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 04:04:56PM +0100, Joey Gouly wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an executable mapping that is also writeable. An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled: mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0); Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below: addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0); mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC); The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case: addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0); mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI); where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64. Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com> Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> --- include/linux/mman.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ include/linux/sched/coredump.h | 6 +++++- include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/sys.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 3 +++ mm/mprotect.c | 5 +++++ 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h index 58b3abd457a3..d84fdeab6b5e 100644 --- a/include/linux/mman.h +++ b/include/linux/mman.h@@ -156,4 +156,19 @@ calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags) } unsigned long vm_commit_limit(void); + +static inline bool map_deny_write_exec(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
Traditionally, it is easier to write these in the positive instead of needing to parse a double-negative. static inline bool allow_write_exec(...)
+{
+ if (!test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags))
+ return false;
+
+ if ((vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+ return true;
+
+ if (vma && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
Since this is implementation "2" from the earlier discussion[1], I think
some comments in here are good to have. (e.g. to explain to people
reading this code why there is a vma test, etc.) Perhaps even explicit
repeat the implementation expectations.
Restating from that thread:
2. "is not already PROT_EXEC":
a) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC); // fails
b) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);
mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI); // passes
c) mmap(PROT_READ);
mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // fails
d) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
mprotect(PROT_READ);
mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // fails
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/YmGjYYlcSVz38rOe@arm.com/ (local)
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
#endif /* _LINUX_MMAN_H */diff --git a/include/linux/sched/coredump.h b/include/linux/sched/coredump.h index 8270ad7ae14c..0e17ae7fbfd3 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/coredump.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/coredump.h@@ -81,9 +81,13 @@ static inline int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm) * lifecycle of this mm, just for simplicity. */ #define MMF_HAS_PINNED 27 /* FOLL_PIN has run, never cleared */ + +#define MMF_HAS_MDWE 28 +#define MMF_HAS_MDWE_MASK (1 << MMF_HAS_MDWE) + #define MMF_DISABLE_THP_MASK (1 << MMF_DISABLE_THP) #define MMF_INIT_MASK (MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK | MMF_DUMP_FILTER_MASK |\ - MMF_DISABLE_THP_MASK) + MMF_DISABLE_THP_MASK | MMF_HAS_MDWE_MASK)
Good, yes, new "live forever" bit here. Perhaps bikeshedding over the name, see below.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
#endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_COREDUMP_H */diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index a5e06dcbba13..ab9db1e86230 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h@@ -281,6 +281,12 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_SME_VL_LEN_MASK 0xffff # define PR_SME_VL_INHERIT (1 << 17) /* inherit across exec */ +/* Memory deny write / execute */ +#define PR_SET_MDWE 65 +# define PR_MDWE_FLAG_MMAP 1 + +#define PR_GET_MDWE 66 + #define PR_SET_VMA 0x53564d41 # define PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME 0diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 5fd54bf0e886..08e1dd6d2533 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c@@ -2348,6 +2348,18 @@ static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start, } #endif /* CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME */ +static inline int prctl_set_mdwe(void) +{ + set_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags); + + return 0; +} + +static inline int prctl_get_mdwe(void) +{ + return test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags); +}
These will need to change -- the aren't constructed for future expansion
at all. At the very least, all the arguments need to passed to be
checked that they are zero. e.g.:
int prctl_set_mdwe(unsigned long bits, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
return -EINVAL;
...
return 0;
}
Otherwise, there's no way to add arguments in the future because old
userspace may have been sending arbitrary junk on the stack, etc.
And regardless, I think we'll need some explicit flag bits here, since
we can see there has been a long history of various other desired
features that may end up living in here. For now, a single bit is fine.
The intended behavior is the inability to _add_ PROT_EXEC to an existing
vma, and to deny the creating of a W+X vma to begin with, so perhaps
this bit can be named MDWE_FLAG_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN?
Then the above "..." becomes:
if (bits & ~(MDWE_FLAG_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN))
return -EINVAL;
if (bits & MDWE_FLAG_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN)
set_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags);
else if (test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags))
return -EPERM; /* Cannot unset the flag */
And prctl_get_mdwe() becomes:
int prctl_get_mdwe(unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
return -EINVAL;
return test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags) ?
MDWE_FLAG_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN : 0;
}
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) {@@ -2623,6 +2635,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, error = sched_core_share_pid(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); break; #endif + case PR_SET_MDWE: + error = prctl_set_mdwe(); + break; + case PR_GET_MDWE: + error = prctl_get_mdwe(); + break; case PR_SET_VMA: error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); break;diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 099468aee4d8..42eaf6683216 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c@@ -1409,6 +1409,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE; } + if (map_deny_write_exec(NULL, vm_flags)) + return -EACCES; +
This seems like the wrong place to do the check -- that the vma argument
is a hard-coded "NULL" is evidence that something is wrong. Shouldn't
it live in mmap_region()? What happens with MAP_FIXED, when there is
an underlying vma? i.e. an MAP_FIXED will, I think, bypass the intended
check. For example, we had "c" above:
c) mmap(PROT_READ);
mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // fails
But this would allow another case:
e) addr = mmap(..., PROT_READ, ...);
mmap(addr, ..., PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIXED, ...); // passes
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
addr = mmap_region(file, addr, len, vm_flags, pgoff, uf); if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(addr) && ((vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ||diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index 8d770855b591..af71ef0788fd 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c@@ -766,6 +766,11 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, break; } + if (map_deny_write_exec(vma, newflags)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out; + } +
This looks like the right place. Any rationale for why it's before arch_validate_flags()?
/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the new flags */
if (!arch_validate_flags(newflags)) {
error = -EINVAL;-Kees -- Kees Cook _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel