Re: [PATCH RFC 0/4] mm, arm64: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Date: 2022-04-21 18:33:17
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linux-hardening, linux-mm, lkml
On Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 10:41:43AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
On Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 06:24:21PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:quoted
On Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 09:42:23AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:quoted
On Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 04:35:15PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:quoted
Do we want the "was PROT_WRITE" or we just reject mprotect(PROT_EXEC) if the vma is not already PROT_EXEC? The latter is closer to the current systemd approach. The former allows an mprotect(PROT_EXEC) if the mapping was PROT_READ only for example. I'd drop the "was PROT_WRITE" for now if the aim is a drop-in replacement for BPF MDWE.I think "was PROT_WRITE" is an important part of the defense that couldn't be done with a simple seccomp filter (which is why the filter ended up being a problem in the first place).I would say "was PROT_WRITE" is slightly more relaxed than "is not already PROT_EXEC". The seccomp filter can't do "is not already PROT_EXEC" either since it only checks the mprotect() arguments, not the current vma flags. So we have (with sub-cases): 1. Current BPF filter: a) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC); // fails b) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI); // fails c) mmap(PROT_READ); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // fails d) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE); mprotect(PROT_READ); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // fails 2. "is not already PROT_EXEC": a) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC); // fails b) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI); // passes c) mmap(PROT_READ); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // fails d) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE); mprotect(PROT_READ); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // fails 3. "is or was not PROT_WRITE": a) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC); // fails b) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI); // passes c) mmap(PROT_READ); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // passes d) mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE); mprotect(PROT_READ); mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC); // fails[edited above to show each case]
Thanks, I was in a rush to get home ;).
restated what was already summarized: Problem is 1.b. 2 and 3 solve it. 3 is more relaxed (c passes).quoted
If we don't care about 3.c, we might as well go for (2). I don't mind, already went for (3) in this series. I think either of them would not be a regression on MDWE, unless there is some test that attempts 3.c and expects it to fail.I should stop arguing for a less restrictive mode. ;) It just feels weird that the combinations are API-mediated, rather than logically defined: I can do PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC with mmap but not mprotect under 2. As opposed to saying "the vma cannot be executable if it is or ever was writable". I find the latter much easier to reason about as far as the expectations of system state.
I had the same reasoning, hence option 3 in this series. I prefer to treat mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC) and mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC) in a similar way. -- Catalin _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel