Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
From: Thomas Gleixner <hidden>
Date: 2021-03-31 07:54:23
Also in:
linux-hardening, linux-mm, lkml
On Tue, Mar 30 2021 at 13:57, Kees Cook wrote:
+/* + * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because + * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct + * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of + * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see + * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst + * The asm statement is designed to convince the compiler to keep the + * allocation around even after "ptr" goes out of scope.
Nit. That explanation of "ptr" might be better placed right at the add_random...() macro.
+ */
+void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size);
+/*
+ * Use, at most, 10 bits of entropy. We explicitly cap this to keep the
+ * "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). 10 bits leaves enough room for
+ * per-arch offset masks to reduce entropy (by removing higher bits, since
+ * high entropy may overly constrain usable stack space), and for
+ * compiler/arch-specific stack alignment to remove the lower bits.
+ */
+#define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0x3FF)
+
+/*
+ * These macros must be used during syscall entry when interrupts and
+ * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to
+ * the stack.
+ */
+#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \
+ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \
+ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \
+ u32 offset = __this_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \
+ u8 *ptr = __builtin_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)); \
+ asm volatile("" : "=m"(*ptr) :: "memory"); \
+ } \
+} while (0)Other than that. Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <redacted> _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel