Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2021-03-29 18:41:57
Also in:
linux-hardening, linux-mm, lkml
On Sun, Mar 28, 2021 at 04:42:03PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
On Fri, Mar 19 2021 at 14:28, Kees Cook wrote:quoted
+/* + * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because + * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct + * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of + * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see + * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rstVLAs are bad, VLAs to the rescue! :)
I'm aware of the irony, but luto's idea really makes things easy. As documented there, though, this has a hard-coded (low) upper bound, so it's not like "regular" VLA use.
quoted
+ * The asm statement is designed to convince the compiler to keep the + * allocation around even after "ptr" goes out of scope. + */ +void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size); + +#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \ + if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ + &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ + u32 offset = this_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \Not that it matters on x86, but as this has to be called in the interrupt disabled region of the syscall entry, shouldn't this be a raw_cpu_read(). The asm-generic version has a preempt_disable/enable pair around the raw read for native wordsize reads, otherwise a irqsave/restore pair. __this_cpu_read() is fine as well, but that has an sanity check before the raw read when CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT is on, which is harmless but also pointless in this case. Probably the same for the counterpart this_cpu_write().
Oh! Excellent point. I think this will make a big difference on arm64. I will adjust and test. -- Kees Cook _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel