Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
From: Thomas Gleixner <hidden>
Date: 2021-03-28 14:45:28
Also in:
linux-hardening, linux-mm, lkml
Kees, On Fri, Mar 19 2021 at 14:28, Kees Cook wrote:
+/* + * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because + * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct + * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of + * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see + * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
VLAs are bad, VLAs to the rescue! :)
+ * The asm statement is designed to convince the compiler to keep the
+ * allocation around even after "ptr" goes out of scope.
+ */
+void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size);
+
+#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \
+ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \
+ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \
+ u32 offset = this_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \
Not that it matters on x86, but as this has to be called in the
interrupt disabled region of the syscall entry, shouldn't this be a
raw_cpu_read(). The asm-generic version has a preempt_disable/enable
pair around the raw read for native wordsize reads, otherwise a
irqsave/restore pair.
__this_cpu_read() is fine as well, but that has an sanity check before
the raw read when CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT is on, which is harmless but
also pointless in this case.
Probably the same for the counterpart this_cpu_write().
Thanks,
tglx
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