On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 05:40:19PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:

On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 05:46:17PM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote:

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On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 05:23:17PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:

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On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 05:47:05PM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote:

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On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 03:26:03PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:

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+- *Asynchronous* - The kernel raises a ``SIGSEGV``, in the current
+  thread, asynchronously following one or multiple tag check faults,
+  with ``.si_code = SEGV_MTEAERR`` and ``.si_addr = 0``.

For "current thread": that's a kernel concept.  For user-facing
documentation, can we say "the offending thread" or similar?

For clarity, it's worth saying that the faulting address is not
reported.  Or, we could be optimistic that someday this information will
be available and say that si_addr is the faulting address if available,
with 0 meaning the address is not available.

Maybe (void *)-1 would be better duff address, but I can't see it
mattering much.  If there's already precedent for si_addr==0 elsewhere,
it makes sense to follow it.

At a quick grep, I can see a few instances on other architectures where
si_addr==0. I'll add a comment here.

OK, cool

Except: what if we're in PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC mode.  If the SIGSEGV handler
triggers an asynchronous MTE fault itself, we could then get into a
spin.  Hmm.

How do we handle standard segfaults here? Presumably a signal handler
can trigger a SIGSEGV itself.

This is similar to the problem is a data abort inside the data abort
handler.  It can of course happen, but if you don't want this to be
fatal then you code the handler carefully so this can't happen.

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I take it we drain any pending MTE faults when crossing EL boundaries?

We clear the hardware bit on entry to EL1 from EL0 and set a TIF flag.

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In that case, an asynchronous MTE fault pending at sigreturn must have
been caused by the signal handler.  We could make that particular case
of MTE_AERR a force_sig.

We clear the TIF flag when delivering the signal. I don't think there is
a way for the kernel to detect when it is running in a signal handler.
sigreturn() is not mandatory either.

I guess we can put up with this signal not being fatal then.

If you have a SEGV handler at all, you're supposed to code it carefully.

This brings us back to force_sig for SERR and a normal signal for AERR.
That's probably OK.

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+**Note**: Kernel accesses to user memory (e.g. ``read()`` system call)
+are only checked if the current thread tag checking mode is
+PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC.

Vague?  Can we make a precise statement about when the kernel will and
won't check such accesses?  And aren't there limitations (like use of
get_user_pages() etc.)?

We could make it slightly clearer by say "kernel accesses to the user
address space".

That's not the ambiguity.

My question is

1) Does the kernel guarantee not to check tags on kernel accesses to
user memory without PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC?

For ASYNC and NONE, yes, we can guarantee this.

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2) Does the kernel guarantee to check tags on kernel accesses to user
memory with PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC?

I'd say yes but it depends on how much knowledge one has about the
syscall implementation. If it's access to user address directly, it
would be checked. If it goes via get_user_pages(), it won't. Since the
user doesn't need to have knowledge of the kernel internals, you are
right that we don't guarantee this.

So, from userspace it's not guaranteed.

This is what I'd describe as "making best efforts", but not a guarantee.

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In practice, this note sounds to be more like a kernel implementation
detail rather than advice to userspace.

Would it make sense to say something like:

 * PR_MTE_TCF_NONE: the kernel does not check tags for kernel accesses
   to use memory done by syscalls in the thread.

 * PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC: the kernel may check some tags for kernel accesses
   to user memory done by syscalls.  (Should we guarantee that such
   faults are reported synchronously on syscall exit?  In practice I
   think they are.  Should we use SEGV_MTESERR in this case?  Perhaps
   it's not worth making this a special case.)

Both NONE and ASYNC are now the same for kernel uaccess - not checked.

For background information, I decided against ASYNC uaccess checking
since (1) there are some cases where the kernel overreads
(strncpy_from_user) and (2) we don't normally generate SIGSEGV on
uaccess but rather return -EFAULT. The latter is not possible to contain
since we only learn about the fault asynchronously, usually after the
transfer.

I may be missing something here.  Do we still rely on the hardware to
detect tag mismatches in kernel accesses to user memory?  I was assuming
we do some kind of explicit checking, but now I think that's nonsense
(except for get_user_pages() etc.)


Since MTE is a new opt-in feature, I think we might have the option to
report failures with SIGSEGV instead of -EFAULT.  This seems exactly to
implement the concept of an asynchronous versus synchronous error. 

The kernel may not normally do this, but software usually doesn't use
raw syscalls.  In reality "syscalls" can trigger a SIGSEGV in the libc
wrapper anyway.  From the caller's point of view the whole thing is a
black box.

Probably needs discussion with the bionic / glibc folks though (though
likely this has been discussed already...)


My concern is that the spirit of asynchrous checking in the architecture
is that accesses _are_ checked, and we seem to be breaking that
principle here.

Although MTE's guarantees are statistical, based on small random numbers
not matching, this imperfection is quite different from systematically
not checking at all, ever, on certain major code paths.

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 * PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC: the kernel makes best efforts to check tags for
   kernel accesses to user memory done by the syscalls, but does not
   guarantee to check everything (or does it?  I thought we can't really
   do that for some odd cases...)

It doesn't. I'll add some notes along the lines of your text above.

OK

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+excludes all tags other than 0. A user thread can enable specific tags
+in the randomly generated set using the ``prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,
+flags, 0, 0, 0)`` system call where ``flags`` contains the tags bitmap
+in the ``PR_MTE_TAG_MASK`` bit-field.
+
+**Note**: The hardware uses an exclude mask but the ``prctl()``
+interface provides an include mask. An include mask of ``0`` (exclusion
+mask ``0xffff``) results in the CPU always generating tag ``0``.

Is there no way to make this default to 1 rather than having a magic
meaning for 0?

We follow the hardware behaviour where 0xffff and 0xfffe give the same
result.

Exposing this through a purely software interface seems a bit odd:
because the exclude mask is privileged-access-only, the architecture
could amend it to assign a different meaning to 0xffff, providing this
was an opt-in change.  Then we'd have to make a mess here.

You have a point. An include mask of 0 translates to an exclude mask of
0xffff as per the current patches. If the hardware gains support for one
more bit (32 colours), old software running on new hardware may run into
unexpected results with an exclude mask of 0xffff.

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Can't we just forbid the nonsense value 0 here, or are there other
reasons why that's problematic?

It was just easier to start with a default. I wonder whether we should
actually switch back to the exclude mask, as per the hardware
definition. This way 0 would mean all tags allowed. We can still
disallow 0xffff as an exclude mask.

If the number of bits might grow, I guess we can make the exclude mask
full-width.

For example, the hardware can trivially exclude tags 16 and up, because
they don't exist anyway.

Similarly, the hardware can trivially include tags 16 and up: inclusion
only means that the hardware is allowed to generate them, not that it
guarantees to.

The only configuration that doesn't make sense is "no tags allowed", so
I'd argue for explicity blocking that, even if the architeture alises
that encoding to something else.

If we prefer 0 as a default value so that init inherits the correct
value from the kernel without any special acrobatics, then we make it an
exclude mask, with the semantics that the hardware is allowed to
generate any of these tags, but does not have to be capable of
generating all of them.

Make sense?  This is bikeshedding from my end...


Cheers
---Dave

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