[PATCH v2 0/5] arm64: kernel: Add support for User Access Override

On Mon, Mar 7, 2016 at 9:38 AM, Catalin Marinas [off-list ref] wrote:

(cc'ing Kees)

On Mon, Mar 07, 2016 at 04:43:19PM +0000, James Morse wrote:

quoted

I've just spotted UAO causes the test_user_copy module (CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY)
to fail. Who to blame is up for discussion. The test is passing a user pointer
as the 'to' field of copy_from_user(), which it expects to fail gracefully:

lib/test_user_copy.c:75

quoted

    /* Invalid usage: none of these should succeed. */

[ ... ]

quoted

    ret |= test(!copy_from_user(bad_usermem, (char __user *)kmem,
                                PAGE_SIZE),
                "illegal reversed copy_from_user passed");

access_ok() catches the "(char __user *)kmem", causing copy_from_user() to pass
bad_usermem to memset():

arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h:279

quoted

    if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
            n = __copy_from_user(to, from, n);
    else /* security hole - plug it */
            memset(to, 0, n);

This (correctly) trips UAO's "Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h
routines" message, which is a little confusing to debug, and stops the rest of
the module's tests from being run.

I suggest we don't do anything on arch/arm64 (or arch/arm), I just
consider the test to be broken. The semantics of copy_from_user() don't
say anything about the safety checks on the destination pointer, this is
supposed to be a valid kernel address. The test assumes that if the
source pointer is invalid, the copy_from_user() routine should not touch
the destination.

Hmmm, I'd prefer that copy_*_user was checking both src and
destination. That's what these tests are checking for.

A better test would be to use a destination buffer filled with a poison
value and checked after the operation.

Well, I could certainly add that check, but I'd prefer that a bogus
destination be rejected.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security