Thread (26 messages) 26 messages, 4 authors, 2014-09-04

[PATCH v4 8/8] ARM: mm: allow text and rodata sections to be read-only

From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2014-08-20 12:52:18
Also in: lkml

On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 7:36 AM, Will Deacon [off-list ref] wrote:
On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 06:06:33PM +0100, Kees Cook wrote:
quoted
This introduces CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, making kernel text and rodata
read-only. Additionally, this splits rodata from text so that rodata can
also be NX, which may lead to wasted memory when aligning to SECTION_SIZE.
The read-only areas are made writable during ftrace updates and kexec.
[...]
quoted
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
index af9a8a927a4e..b8c75e45a950 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/stop_machine.h>

 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/opcodes.h>
@@ -35,6 +36,22 @@

 #define      OLD_NOP         0xe1a00000      /* mov r0, r0 */

+static int __ftrace_modify_code(void *data)
+{
+     int *command = data;
+
+     set_kernel_text_rw();
+     ftrace_modify_all_code(*command);
+     set_kernel_text_ro();
+
+     return 0;
+}
+
+void arch_ftrace_update_code(int command)
+{
+     stop_machine(__ftrace_modify_code, &command, NULL);
+}
+
 static unsigned long ftrace_nop_replace(struct dyn_ftrace *rec)
 {
      return rec->arch.old_mcount ? OLD_NOP : NOP;
@@ -73,6 +90,8 @@ int ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(void)
 int ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process(void)
 {
      set_all_modules_text_ro();
+     /* Make sure any TLB misses during machine stop are cleared. */
+     flush_tlb_all();
I'm afraid I don't understand what you're trying to achieve here. What do
you mean by `clearing a TLB miss'?
The concern with the local TLB flush when using section_update is that
another CPU might come along and load the temporarily-writable page
permissions during the time the first CPU has called
set_kernel_text_rw() and set_kernel_text_ro(). The call here to
flush_tlb_all() is to make sure all CPUs have the correct page
permissions visible again.

(This is all to work around the a15 errata, and also part of the
output from the thread I mentioned in my 7/8 comment reply.)
[...]
quoted
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
index ccf392ef40d4..35c838da90d5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
@@ -626,9 +626,10 @@ struct section_perm {
      unsigned long end;
      pmdval_t mask;
      pmdval_t prot;
+     pmdval_t clear;
 };

-struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
+static struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
      /* Make pages tables, etc before _stext RW (set NX). */
      {
              .start  = PAGE_OFFSET,
@@ -643,8 +644,35 @@ struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
              .mask   = ~PMD_SECT_XN,
              .prot   = PMD_SECT_XN,
      },
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+     /* Make rodata NX (set RO in ro_perms below). */
+     {
+             .start  = (unsigned long)__start_rodata,
+             .end    = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
+             .mask   = ~PMD_SECT_XN,
+             .prot   = PMD_SECT_XN,
+     },
+#endif
 };

+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+static struct section_perm ro_perms[] = {
+     /* Make kernel code and rodata RX (set RO). */
+     {
+             .start  = (unsigned long)_stext,
+             .end    = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
+             .mask   = ~PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
+             .prot   = PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
+#else
+             .mask   = ~(PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE),
+             .prot   = PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
+             .clear  = PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
+#endif
+     },
+};
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Updates section permissions only for the current mm (sections are
  * copied into each mm). During startup, this is the init_mm.
@@ -713,6 +741,24 @@ static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void)
 {
      set_section_perms(nx_perms, prot);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void)
+{
+     set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
+}
+
+void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
+{
+     set_section_perms(ro_perms, clear);
+}
How does this work with LPAE? I don't see a populated clear field there.
LPAE's case has .clear=0 since it only needs the mask -- it has no
bits from the mask to set when clearing. Maybe I need better field
names. It was "'mask' used to unset bits" with "bits to set when
'prot'ecting" and "bits to set when 'clear'ing".

The non-LPAE case masks out "~(PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE)" and
then sets either "PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE" to set the ro
state, or sets "PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE" to clear the ro state.

The LPAE case masks out "~PMD_SECT_RDONLY" and then sets either
"PMD_SECT_RDONLY" to set the ro state, or sets nothing to clear the ro
state (the mask did everything needed to clear the ro state).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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