On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:

On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:51 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

quoted

On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:32 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On 06/25, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

quoted

Write the filter, then smp_mb (or maybe a weaker barrier is okay),
then set the bit.

Yes, exactly, this is what I meant. Plas rmb() in __secure_computing().

But I still can't understand the rest of your discussion about the
ordering we need ;)

Let me try again from scratch.

Currently there are three relevant variables: TIF_SECCOMP,
seccomp.mode, and seccomp.filter.  __secure_computing needs
seccomp.mode and seccomp.filter to be in sync, and it wants (but
doesn't really need) TIF_SECCOMP to be in sync as well.

My suggestion is to rearrange it a bit.  Move mode into seccomp.filter
(so that filter == NULL implies no seccomp) and don't check

This would require that we reimplement mode 1 seccomp via mode 2
filters. Which isn't too hard, but may add complexity.

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TIF_SECCOMP in secure_computing.  Then turning on seccomp is entirely
atomic except for the fact that the seccomp hooks won't be called if
filter != NULL but !TIF_SECCOMP.  This removes all ordering
requirements.

Ah, got it, thanks. Perhaps I missed somehing, but to me this looks like
unnecessary complication at first glance.

We alredy have TIF_SECCOMP, we need it anyway, and we should only care
about the case when this bit is actually set, so that we can race with
the 1st call of __secure_computing().

Otherwise we are fine: we can miss the new filter anyway, ->mode can't
be changed it is already nonzero.

quoted

Alternatively, __secure_computing could still BUG_ON(!seccomp.filter).
In that case, filter needs to be set before TIF_SECCOMP is set, but
that's straightforward.

Yep. And this is how seccomp_assign_mode() already works? It is called
after we change ->filter chain, it changes ->mode before set(TIF_SECCOMP)
just it lacks a barrier.

Right, I think the best solution is to add the barrier. I was
concerned that adding the read barrier in secure_computing would have
a performance impact, though.

I can't speak for ARM, but I think that all of the read barriers are
essentially free on x86.  (smp_mb is a very different story, but that
shouldn't be needed here.)

--Andy