On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:24 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:
On 06/25, Kees Cook wrote:
quoted
On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Yes, at least this should close the race with suid-exec. And there are no
other users. Except apparmor, and I hope you will check it because I simply
do not know what it does ;)
quoted
I wonder if changes to nnp need to "flushed" during syscall entry
instead of getting updated externally/asynchronously? That way it
won't be out of sync with the seccomp mode/filters.
Perhaps secure computing needs to check some (maybe seccomp-only)
atomic flags and flip on the "real" nnp if found?
Not sure I understand you, could you clarify?
Instead of having TSYNC change the nnp bit, it can set a new flag, say:
task->seccomp.flags |= SECCOMP_NEEDS_NNP;
This would be set along with seccomp.mode, seccomp.filter, and
TIF_SECCOMP. Then, during the next secure_computing() call that thread
makes, it would check the flag:
if (task->seccomp.flags & SECCOMP_NEEDS_NNP)
task->nnp = 1;
This means that nnp couldn't change in the middle of a running syscall.
Aha, so you were worried about the same thing. Not sure we need this,
but at least I understand you and...
quoted
Hmmm. Perhaps this doesn't solve anything, though? Perhaps my proposal
above would actually make things worse, since now we'd have a thread
with seccomp set up, and no nnp. If it was in the middle of exec,
we're still causing a problem.
Yes ;)
quoted
I think we'd also need a way to either delay the seccomp changes, or
to notice this condition during exec. Bleh.
Hmm. confused again,
quoted
What actually happens with a multi-threaded process calls exec? I
assume all the other threads are destroyed?
Yes. But this is the point-of-no-return, de_thread() is called after the execing
thared has already passed (say) check_unsafe_exec().
However, do_execve() takes cred_guard_mutex at the start in prepare_bprm_creds()
and drops it in install_exec_creds(), so it should solve the problem?
If you rely on this, then please fix this comment in fs/exec.c:
/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
* - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
* PTRACE_ATTACH
*/
static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
It sounds like cred_guard_mutex is there for exactly this reason :)
--Andy