[PATCH v7] ARM: net: JIT compiler for packet filters
From: Russell King - ARM Linux <hidden>
Date: 2012-03-15 11:41:51
I'm unconvinced that this is safe. On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 12:52:34PM +0100, Mircea Gherzan wrote:
+static int build_body(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ void *load_func[] = {jit_get_skb_b, jit_get_skb_h, jit_get_skb_w};
+ const struct sk_filter *prog = ctx->skf;
+ const struct sock_filter *inst;
+ unsigned i, load_order, off, condt;
+ int imm12;
+ u32 k;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
+ inst = &(prog->insns[i]);
+ /* K as an immediate value operand */
+ k = inst->k;
+
+ /* compute offsets only in the fake pass */
+ if (ctx->target == NULL)
+ ctx->offsets[i] = ctx->idx * 4;
+
+ switch (inst->code) {
+ case BPF_S_LD_IMM:
+ emit_mov_i(r_A, k, ctx);
+ break;
+ case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN:
+ ctx->seen |= SEEN_SKB;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, len) != 4);
+ emit(ARM_LDR_I(r_A, r_skb,
+ offsetof(struct sk_buff, len)), ctx);
+ break;
+ case BPF_S_LD_MEM:
+ /* A = scratch[k] */
+ ctx->seen |= SEEN_MEM_WORD(k);
+ emit(ARM_LDR_I(r_A, ARM_SP, SCRATCH_OFF(k)), ctx);
+ break;
+ case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS:
+ load_order = 2;
+ goto load;
+ case BPF_S_LD_H_ABS:
+ load_order = 1;
+ goto load;
+ case BPF_S_LD_B_ABS:
+ load_order = 0;
+load:
+ /* the interpreter will deal with the negative K */
+ if (k < 0)
+ return -1;k is a u32, so won't this will always be false - negative numbers will appear as huge positive numbers instead.
+ emit_mov_i(r_off, k, ctx);
+load_common:
+ ctx->seen |= SEEN_DATA | SEEN_CALL;
+
+ if (load_order > 0) {
+ emit(ARM_SUB_I(r_scratch, r_skb_hl,
+ 1 << load_order), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_CMP_R(r_scratch, r_off), ctx);
+ condt = ARM_COND_HS;
+ } else {
+ emit(ARM_CMP_R(r_skb_hl, r_off), ctx);
+ condt = ARM_COND_HI;
+ }
+
+ _emit(condt, ARM_ADD_R(r_scratch, r_off, r_skb_data),
+ ctx);
+
+ if (load_order == 0)
+ _emit(condt, ARM_LDRB_I(r_A, r_scratch, 0),
+ ctx);
+ else if (load_order == 1)
+ emit_load_be16(condt, r_A, r_scratch, ctx);
+ else if (load_order == 2)
+ emit_load_be32(condt, r_A, r_scratch, ctx);I think this is creating code to do something like this: sub r_scratch, r_skb_hl, #1 << load_order cmp r_scratch, k ldrhs dest, [r_skb_data, k] Isn't this going to perform the loads for any k greater than the header length? What stops k being larger than the packet? And is this correct in the first place?
+ + _emit(condt, ARM_B(b_imm(i + 1, ctx)), ctx); + + /* the slowpath */ + emit_mov_i(ARM_R3, (u32)load_func[load_order], ctx); + emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_R0, r_skb), ctx); + /* the offset is already in R1 */ + emit_blx_r(ARM_R3, ctx); + /* check the result of skb_copy_bits */ + emit(ARM_CMP_I(ARM_R1, 0), ctx); + emit_err_ret(ARM_COND_NE, ctx); + emit(ARM_MOV_R(r_A, ARM_R0), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_LD_W_IND: + load_order = 2; + goto load_ind; + case BPF_S_LD_H_IND: + load_order = 1; + goto load_ind; + case BPF_S_LD_B_IND: + load_order = 0; +load_ind: + OP_IMM3(ARM_ADD, r_off, r_X, k, ctx); + goto load_common; + case BPF_S_LDX_IMM: + ctx->seen |= SEEN_X; + emit_mov_i(r_X, k, ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN: + ctx->seen |= SEEN_X | SEEN_SKB; + emit(ARM_LDR_I(r_X, r_skb, + offsetof(struct sk_buff, len)), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_LDX_MEM: + ctx->seen |= SEEN_X | SEEN_MEM_WORD(k); + emit(ARM_LDR_I(r_X, ARM_SP, SCRATCH_OFF(k)), ctx);
What about this - SCRATCH_OFF() is just a simple: +#define SCRATCH_OFF(k) (SCRATCH_SP_OFFSET + (k)) So what if 'k' is a carefully chosen 32-bit number outside of the range of the stack? Shouldn't there be a check for k < BPF_MEMWORDS to fail the translation where-ever SEEN_MEM_WORD(k) or SCRATCH_OFF(k) is used?
+ break; + case BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH: + /* x = ((*(frame + k)) & 0xf) << 2; */
So, k is passed in from userspace. What stops k being out of the bounds of 'frame' and referring to other kernel space data via carefully crafted bpf code?
+ ctx->seen |= SEEN_X | SEEN_DATA | SEEN_CALL; + /* the interpreter should deal with the negative K */ + if (k < 0) + return -1; + /* offset in r1: we might have to take the slow path */ + emit_mov_i(r_off, k, ctx); + emit(ARM_CMP_R(r_skb_hl, r_off), ctx); + + /* load in r0: common with the slowpath */ + _emit(ARM_COND_HI, ARM_LDRB_R(ARM_R0, r_skb_data, + ARM_R1), ctx); + /* + * emit_mov_i() might generate one or two instructions, + * the same holds for emit_blx_r() + */ + _emit(ARM_COND_HI, ARM_B(b_imm(i + 1, ctx) - 2), ctx); + + emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_R0, r_skb), ctx); + /* r_off is r1 */ + emit_mov_i(ARM_R3, (u32)jit_get_skb_b, ctx); + emit_blx_r(ARM_R3, ctx); + + emit(ARM_AND_I(r_X, ARM_R0, 0x00f), ctx); + emit(ARM_LSL_I(r_X, r_X, 2), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ST: + ctx->seen |= SEEN_MEM_WORD(k); + emit(ARM_STR_I(r_A, ARM_SP, SCRATCH_OFF(k)), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_STX: + update_on_xread(ctx); + ctx->seen |= SEEN_MEM_WORD(k); + emit(ARM_STR_I(r_X, ARM_SP, SCRATCH_OFF(k)), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K: + /* A += K */ + OP_IMM3(ARM_ADD, r_A, r_A, k, ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X: + update_on_xread(ctx); + emit(ARM_ADD_R(r_A, r_A, r_X), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K: + /* A -= K */ + OP_IMM3(ARM_SUB, r_A, r_A, k, ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X: + update_on_xread(ctx); + emit(ARM_SUB_R(r_A, r_A, r_X), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K: + /* A *= K */ + emit_mov_i(r_scratch, k, ctx); + emit(ARM_MUL(r_A, r_A, r_scratch), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X: + update_on_xread(ctx); + emit(ARM_MUL(r_A, r_A, r_X), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K: + /* current k == reciprocal_value(userspace k) */ + emit_mov_i(r_scratch, k, ctx); + /* A = top 32 bits of the product */ + emit(ARM_UMULL(r_scratch, r_A, r_A, r_scratch), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X: + update_on_xread(ctx); + emit(ARM_CMP_I(r_X, 0), ctx); + emit_err_ret(ARM_COND_EQ, ctx); + emit_udiv(r_A, r_A, r_X, ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K: + /* A |= K */ + OP_IMM3(ARM_ORR, r_A, r_A, k, ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X: + update_on_xread(ctx); + emit(ARM_ORR_R(r_A, r_A, r_X), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K: + /* A &= K */ + OP_IMM3(ARM_AND, r_A, r_A, k, ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X: + update_on_xread(ctx); + emit(ARM_AND_R(r_A, r_A, r_X), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K: + if (unlikely(k > 31)) + return -1; + emit(ARM_LSL_I(r_A, r_A, k), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X: + update_on_xread(ctx); + emit(ARM_LSL_R(r_A, r_A, r_X), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K: + if (unlikely(k > 31)) + return -1; + emit(ARM_LSR_I(r_A, r_A, k), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X: + update_on_xread(ctx); + emit(ARM_LSR_R(r_A, r_A, r_X), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_ALU_NEG: + /* A = -A */ + emit(ARM_RSB_I(r_A, r_A, 0), ctx); + break; + case BPF_S_JMP_JA: + /* pc += K */ + emit(ARM_B(b_imm(i + k + 1, ctx)), ctx);
This seems to allow the offset[] array to be indexed by an out of bounds 32-bit offset (k). What stops that, therefore what prevents reading a target jump address from a random location in kernel space? I think b_imm() should check that it's not going to overflow its array of offsets.