Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation

[PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
[PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
[PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references · Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> · 2018-01-19
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references · Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> · 2018-01-19
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references · Cyril Novikov <hidden> · 2018-01-25
Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-25
[PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
[PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
[PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
[PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
[PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Jiri Slaby <hidden> · 2018-01-24
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Luis Henriques <hidden> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> · 2018-02-06
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-02-07
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> · 2018-02-07
Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation · Luis Henriques <hidden> · 2018-02-06
[PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
[PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
Re: [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params · Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> · 2018-01-21
[PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-19
Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation · Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> · 2018-01-19
Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution · Dan Williams <hidden> · 2018-01-20
Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution · Alexei Starovoitov <hidden> · 2018-01-20
Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution · Alexei Starovoitov <hidden> · 2018-01-20

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: 2018-02-06 20:43:19
Also in: lkml

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Linus Torvalds
[off-list ref] wrote:

Sadly, that is *very* easy to miscompile.

Side note: don't read email, go watch the falcon heavy takeoff.

              Linus

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