On Wed, Aug 02, 2023 at 10:44:27AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+/**
+ * security_setselfattr - Set an LSM attribute on the current process.
+ * @attr: which attribute to set
+ * @ctx: the user-space source for the information
Would be more idiomatic to name the user arg uctx.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ * @size: the size of the data
+ * @flags: reserved for future use, must be 0
+ *
+ * Set an LSM attribute for the current process. The LSM, attribute
+ * and new value are included in @ctx.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if the input is inconsistent, -EFAULT
+ * if the user buffer is inaccessible or an LSM specific failure.
+ */
+int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
+ size_t size, u32 flags)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ struct lsm_ctx *lctx;
+ int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setselfattr);
+
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (size < sizeof(*ctx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
I think it would be cleaner to check against lctx.
But the actual point is that you want an upper bound here.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ lctx = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (lctx == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&lctx, ctx, size))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
One commenter over already mentioned this should be lctx, not &lctx.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ if (size < lctx->len || size < lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(ctx) ||
+ lctx->len < lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(ctx))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
This leaks lctx.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setselfattr, list)
+ if ((hp->lsmid->id) == lctx->id) {
+ rc = hp->hook.setselfattr(attr, lctx, size, flags);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ kfree(lctx);
+ return rc;
+}
+