On Fri, Dec 02, 2022 at 04:35:58PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:

For the current shadow stack implementation, shadow stacks contents can't
easily be provisioned with arbitrary data. This property helps apps
protect themselves better, but also restricts any potential apps that may
want to do exotic things at the expense of a little security.

The x86 shadow stack feature introduces a new instruction, wrss, which
can be enabled to write directly to shadow stack permissioned memory from
userspace. Allow it to get enabled via the prctl interface.

Only enable the userspace wrss instruction, which allows writes to
userspace shadow stacks from userspace. Do not allow it to be enabled
independently of shadow stack, as HW does not support using WRSS when
shadow stack is disabled.

From a fault handler perspective, WRSS will behave very similar to WRUSS,
which is treated like a user access from a #PF err code perspective.

Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <redacted>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <redacted>

-- 
Kees Cook