Re: [PATCH v26 1/9] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for Indirect Branch Tracking

[PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
[PATCH v26 1/9] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
Re: [PATCH v26 1/9] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for Indirect Branch Tracking · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
[PATCH v26 2/9] x86/cet/ibt: Add user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
Re: [PATCH v26 2/9] x86/cet/ibt: Add user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
[PATCH v26 4/9] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
Re: [PATCH v26 4/9] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
[PATCH v26 3/9] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
Re: [PATCH v26 3/9] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
[PATCH v26 5/9] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
[PATCH v26 6/9] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
Re: [PATCH v26 6/9] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 6/9] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO · Yu, Yu-cheng <hidden> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 6/9] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
[PATCH v26 7/9] x86/vdso: Introduce ENDBR macro · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
Re: [PATCH v26 7/9] x86/vdso: Introduce ENDBR macro · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
[PATCH v26 8/9] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR to __kernel_vsyscall entry point · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
Re: [PATCH v26 8/9] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR to __kernel_vsyscall entry point · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 8/9] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR to __kernel_vsyscall entry point · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
[PATCH v26 9/9] x86/vdso: Add ENDBR to __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave · Yu-cheng Yu <hidden> · 2021-04-27
Re: [PATCH v26 9/9] x86/vdso: Add ENDBR to __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave · Kees Cook <hidden> · 2021-04-28
RE: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · David Laight <hidden> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · H.J. Lu <hidden> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> · 2021-04-28
RE: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · David Laight <hidden> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu, Yu-cheng <hidden> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · H.J. Lu <hidden> · 2021-04-28
Re: [PATCH v26 0/9] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking · Yu, Yu-cheng <hidden> · 2021-04-28

From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2021-04-28 20:29:28
Also in: linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-mm, lkml

On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 01:47:12PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:

Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
oriented programming attacks.  It is active when the kernel has this
feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
work, but without IBT protection.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <redacted>

-- 
Kees Cook

`h`	back out one level
`j`	next message in thread
`k`	previous message in thread
`l`	drill in
`Esc`	close help / fold thread tree
`?`	toggle this help