Thread (59 messages) 59 messages, 6 authors, 2021-01-27

Re: [PATCH v17 02/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Date: 2021-01-19 11:28:56
Also in: linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-mm, lkml

On Tue, Dec 29, 2020 at 01:30:29PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption.  It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_CET_USER enabled, and the application is built for the feature.
This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel.  When it is enabled, legacy
non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <redacted>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7b6dd10b162a..72cff400b9ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1950,6 +1950,28 @@ config X86_SGX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+	def_bool n
+
+config X86_CET_USER
That thing needs to be X86_CET. How many times do I need to type this
before you do it?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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