On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 04:43:37PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
* Kees Cook:
quoted
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:43:34AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
quoted
* Kees Cook:
quoted
Maybe I've missed some earlier discussion that ruled this out, but I
couldn't find it: let's just add O_EXEC and be done with it. It actually
makes the execve() path more like openat2() and is much cleaner after
a little refactoring. Here are the results, though I haven't emailed it
yet since I still want to do some more testing:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=kspp/o_exec/v1
I think POSIX specifies O_EXEC in such a way that it does not confer
read permissions. This seems incompatible with what we are trying to
achieve here.
I was trying to retain this behavior, since we already make this
distinction between execve() and uselib() with the MAY_* flags:
execve():
struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
uselib():
static const struct open_flags uselib_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC,
I tried to retain this in my proposal, in the O_EXEC does not imply
MAY_READ:
That doesn't quite parse for me, sorry.
The point is that the script interpreter actually needs to *read* those
files in order to execute them.
I think I misunderstood what you meant (Mickaël got me sorted out
now). If O_EXEC is already meant to be "EXEC and _not_ READ nor WRITE",
then yes, this new flag can't be O_EXEC. I was reading the glibc
documentation (which treats it as a permission bit flag, not POSIX,
which treats it as a complete mode description).
--
Kees Cook