Thread (4 messages) 4 messages, 4 authors, 2020-05-19

Re: How about just O_EXEC? (was Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC)

From: Florian Weimer <hidden>
Date: 2020-05-15 14:43:59
Also in: linux-fsdevel, linux-integrity, linux-security-module, lkml

* Kees Cook:
On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:43:34AM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
quoted
* Kees Cook:
quoted
Maybe I've missed some earlier discussion that ruled this out, but I
couldn't find it: let's just add O_EXEC and be done with it. It actually
makes the execve() path more like openat2() and is much cleaner after
a little refactoring. Here are the results, though I haven't emailed it
yet since I still want to do some more testing:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=kspp/o_exec/v1
I think POSIX specifies O_EXEC in such a way that it does not confer
read permissions.  This seems incompatible with what we are trying to
achieve here.
I was trying to retain this behavior, since we already make this
distinction between execve() and uselib() with the MAY_* flags:

execve():
        struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
                .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
                .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,

uselib():
        static const struct open_flags uselib_flags = {
                .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
                .acc_mode = MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC,

I tried to retain this in my proposal, in the O_EXEC does not imply
MAY_READ:
That doesn't quite parse for me, sorry.

The point is that the script interpreter actually needs to *read* those
files in order to execute them.

Thanks,
Florian
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