Thread (107 messages) 107 messages, 7 authors, 2020-04-08

Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection

From: Yu-cheng Yu <hidden>
Date: 2020-03-05 20:38:18
Also in: linux-arch, linux-doc, linux-mm, lkml

On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 09:03 -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 2/5/20 10:19 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
quoted
Introduce Kconfig option: X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER.

Shadow Stack (SHSTK) provides protection against function return address
corruption.  It is active when the kernel has this feature enabled, and
both the processor and the application support it.  When this feature is
enabled, legacy non-SHSTK applications continue to work, but without SHSTK
protection.

The user-mode SHSTK protection is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel.
IA32 applications are supported under the compatibility mode.
I think what you're trying to say here is that the hardware supports
shadow stacks with 32-bit kernels.  However, this series does not
include that support and we have no plans to add it.

Right?
Yes.
I'll let others weigh in, but I rather dislike the use of acronyms here.
 I'd much rather see the english "shadow stack" everywhere than SHSTK.
I will change to shadow stack.
quoted
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 5e8949953660..6c34b701c588 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1974,6 +1974,28 @@ config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
 	  side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
 endchoice
 
+config X86_INTEL_CET
+	def_bool n
+
+config ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+	def_bool n
+
+config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
+	prompt "Intel Shadow Stack for user-mode"
Nit: this whole thing is to support more than a single stack.  I'd make
this plural at least in the text: "shadow stacks".
OK.
quoted
+	def_bool n
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	select X86_INTEL_CET
+	select ARCH_HAS_SHSTK
+	---help---
+	  Shadow Stack (SHSTK) provides protection against program
+	  stack corruption.  It is active when the kernel has this
+	  feature enabled, and the processor and the application
+	  support it.  When this feature is enabled, legacy non-SHSTK
+	  applications continue to work, but without SHSTK protection.
+
+	  If unsure, say y.
This is missing a *lot* of information.

What matters to someone turning this on?

1. It's a hardware feature.  This only matters if you have the right
   hardware
2. It's a security hardening feature.  You dance around this, but need
   to come out and say it.
3. Apps must be enabled to use it.  You get no protection "for free" on
   old userspace.
4. The hardware supports user and kernel, but this option is for
   userspace only.
I will update the help text.

Yu-cheng
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