[PATCH v3 bpf-next 3/3] perf: implement CAP_TRACING
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Date: 2019-09-04 18:44:00
Also in:
bpf, netdev
Subsystem:
linux for powerpc (32-bit and 64-bit), performance events subsystem, the rest, tracing, x86 architecture (32-bit and 64-bit) · Maintainers:
Madhavan Srinivasan, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo, Namhyung Kim, Linus Torvalds, Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen
Implement permissions as stated in uapi/linux/capability.h Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> --- arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c | 2 +- kernel/events/core.c | 14 +++++++------- kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c | 2 +- kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
index ca92e01d0bd1..a204a3c6c68b 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) if (!(mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE) || sdar_valid) *addrp = mfspr(SPRN_SDAR); - if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && + if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing() && is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR))) *addrp = 0; }
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) * exporting it to userspace (avoid exposure of regions * where we could have speculative execution) */ - if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && + if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing() && is_kernel_addr(addr)) continue;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 5ee3fed881d3..bd713b2dd7c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event) * users to profile the kernel. */ if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() && - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + !capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 648260b5f367..277b12c054fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c@@ -3307,7 +3307,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event) if (x86_pmu.version < 3) return -EINVAL; - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ANY;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
index dee579efb2b2..f379a358c9cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event) * the user needs special permissions to be able to use it */ if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) { - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; }
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 0463c1151bae..eaba102e5d91 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c@@ -4134,7 +4134,7 @@ find_get_context(struct pmu *pmu, struct task_struct *task, if (!task) { /* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */ - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable_tracing()) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
@@ -8741,7 +8741,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type) return -ENOENT; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; /*
@@ -8801,7 +8801,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type) return -ENOENT; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; /*
@@ -10588,7 +10588,7 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr, } /* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */ if ((mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) - && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; }
@@ -10807,12 +10807,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, return err; if (!attr.exclude_kernel) { - if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; } if (attr.namespaces) { - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; }
@@ -10826,7 +10826,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, /* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) && - perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable_tracing()) return -EACCES; /*
diff --git a/kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c b/kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c
index c5cd852fe86b..8bc4d7d8c913 100644
--- a/kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/kernel/events/hw_breakpoint.c@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ static int hw_breakpoint_parse(struct perf_event *bp, * Don't let unprivileged users set a breakpoint in the trap * path to avoid trap recursion attacks. */ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable_tracing()) return -EPERM; }
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
index 0892e38ed6fb..6861307f14d6 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event, /* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */ if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) { - if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable_tracing()) return -EPERM; if (!is_sampling_event(p_event))
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event, * ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak, * only allow root to have these. */ - if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable_tracing()) return -EPERM; return 0;
--
2.20.0