[PATCH v3 bpf-next 1/3] capability: introduce CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Date: 2019-09-04 18:43:42
Also in:
bpf, netdev
Subsystem:
capabilities, selinux security module, the rest · Maintainers:
Serge Hallyn, Paul Moore, Stephen Smalley, Linus Torvalds
Split BPF and perf/tracing operations that are allowed under
CAP_SYS_ADMIN into corresponding CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING.
For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.
The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
- for tracing program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING
- for networking program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, CGROUP_SKB, SK_SKB, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN
There are few exceptions from this simple rule:
- bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
ftrace mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_TRACING.
- cpumap is used by XDP programs. Currently it's kept under CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
but could be relaxed to CAP_NET_ADMIN in the future.
- BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
to discourage production use.
- BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- cg_sysctl, cg_device, lirc program types are neither networking nor tracing.
They can be loaded under CAP_BPF, but attach is allowed under CAP_NET_ADMIN.
This will be cleaned up in the future.
userid=nobody + (CAP_TRACING | CAP_NET_ADMIN) + CAP_BPF is safer than
typical setup with userid=root and sudo by existing bpf applications.
It's not secure, since these capabilities:
- allow bpf progs access arbitrary memory
- let tasks access any bpf map
- let tasks attach/detach any bpf prog
bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should not be installed with
cap_bpf+cap_tracing, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
CAP_BPF, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_TRACING are roughly equal in terms of
damage they can make to the system.
Example:
CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic. CAP_BPF can write into map
and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog the network traffic
may stop.
CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.
CAP_TRACING allows many kprobes that can slow down the system.
In the future more fine-grained bpf permissions may be added.
v2->v3:
- dropped ftrace and kallsyms from CAP_TRACING description.
In the future these mechanisms can start using it too.
- added CAP_SYS_ADMIN backward compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 18 +++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 +--
3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index ecce0f43c73a..13eb49c75797 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h@@ -247,6 +247,24 @@ static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) return true; } #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ + +static inline bool capable_bpf(void) +{ + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_BPF); +} +static inline bool capable_tracing(void) +{ + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_TRACING); +} +static inline bool capable_bpf_tracing(void) +{ + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (capable(CAP_BPF) && capable(CAP_TRACING)); +} +static inline bool capable_bpf_net_admin(void) +{ + return (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_BPF)) && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN); +} + extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode); extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..fb71dee0ac2b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h@@ -366,8 +366,54 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* + * CAP_BPF allows the following BPF operations: + * - Loading all types of BPF programs + * - Creating all types of BPF maps except: + * - stackmap that needs CAP_TRACING + * - devmap that needs CAP_NET_ADMIN + * - cpumap that needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * - Advanced verifier features + * - Indirect variable access + * - Bounded loops + * - BPF to BPF function calls + * - Scalar precision tracking + * - Larger complexity limits + * - Dead code elimination + * - And potentially other features + * - Use of pointer-to-integer conversions in BPF programs + * - Bypassing of speculation attack hardening measures + * - Loading BPF Type Format (BTF) data + * - Iterate system wide loaded programs, maps, BTF objects + * - Retrieve xlated and JITed code of BPF programs + * - Access maps and programs via id + * - Use bpf_spin_lock() helper + * + * CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING together allow the following: + * - bpf_probe_read to read arbitrary kernel memory + * - bpf_trace_printk to print data to ftrace ring buffer + * - Attach to raw_tracepoint + * - Query association between kprobe/tracepoint and bpf program + * + * CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN together allow the following: + * - Attach to cgroup-bpf hooks and query + * - skb, xdp, flow_dissector test_run command + * + * CAP_NET_ADMIN allows: + * - Attach networking bpf programs to xdp, tc, lwt, flow dissector + */ +#define CAP_BPF 38 + +/* + * CAP_TRACING allows: + * - Full use of perf_event_open(), similarly to the effect of + * kernel.perf_event_paranoid == -1 + * - Creation of [ku][ret]probe + * - Attach tracing bpf programs to perf events + */ +#define CAP_TRACING 39 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_TRACING #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 201f7e588a29..0b364e245163 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap" #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "bpf", "tracing" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_TRACING #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. #endif
--
2.20.0