On Tue, 2019-05-14 at 18:39 -0500, Rob Landley wrote:
On 5/14/19 2:18 PM, James Bottomley wrote:
quoted
quoted
I think Rob is right here. If /init was statically built into
the kernel image, it has no more ability to compromise the kernel
than anything else in the kernel. What's the problem here?
The specific problem is that unless you own the kernel signing key,
which is really untrue for most distribution consumers because the
distro owns the key, you cannot build the initrd statically into
the kernel. You can take the distro signed kernel, link it with
the initrd then resign the combination with your key, provided you
insert your key into the MoK variables as a trusted secure boot
key, but the distros have been unhappy recommending this as
standard practice.
If our model for security is going to be to link the kernel and the
initrd statically to give signature protection over the aggregate
then we need to figure out how to execute this via the distros. If
we accept that the split model, where the distro owns and signs the
kernel but the machine owner builds and is responsible for the
initrd, then we need to explore split security models like this
proposal.
You can have a built-in and an external initrd? The second extracts
over the first? (I know because once upon a time conflicting files
would append. It sounds like the desired behavior here is O_EXCL fail
and move on.)
Technically yes, because the first initrd could find the second by some
predefined means, extract it to a temporary directory and do a
pivot_root() and then the second would do some stuff, find the real
root and do a pivot_root() again. However, while possible, wouldn't it
just add to the rendezvous complexity without adding any benefits? even
if the first initrd is built and signed by the distro and the second is
built by you, the first has to verify the second somehow. I suppose
the second could be tar extracted, which would add xattrs, if that's
the goal?
James