Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces

From
Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Date
2017-11-06 15:03:08
Also in
lkml, netdev
Reply to
Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार), 2017-11-06
Quoting Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) (maheshb@google.com):
On Sat, Nov 4, 2017 at 4:53 PM, Serge E. Hallyn [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Quoting Mahesh Bandewar (mahesh@bandewar.net):
quoted
Init-user-ns is always uncontrolled and a process that has SYS_ADMIN
that belongs to uncontrolled user-ns can create another (child) user-
namespace that is uncontrolled. Any other process (that either does
not have SYS_ADMIN or belongs to a controlled user-ns) can only
create a user-ns that is controlled.
That's a huge change though.  It means that any system that previously
used unprivileged containers will need new privileged code (which always
risks more privilege leaks through the new code) to re-enable what was
possible without privilege before.  That's a regression.
I wouldn't call it a regression since the existing behavior is
preserved as it is if the default-mask is not altered. i.e.
uncontrolled process can create user-ns and have full control inside
that user-ns. The only difference is - as an example if 'something'
comes up which makes a specific capability expose ring-0, so admin can
quickly remove the capability in question from the mask, so that no
untrusted code can exploit that capability until either the kernel is
Oh, sorry, I misread then, and missed that step.  I thought the default
with this patchset was that there were no capabilities exposed to user
namespaces.
patched or workloads are sanitized keeping in mind what was
discovered. (I have given some real life example vulnerabilities
published recently about CAP_NET_RAW in the cover letter)
quoted
I'm very much interested in what you want to do,  But it seems like
it would be worth starting with some automated code analysis that shows
exactly what code becomes accessible to unprivileged users with user
namespaces which was accessible to unprivileged users before.  Then we
can reason about classifying that code and perhaps limiting access to
some of it.
I would like to look at this as 'a tool' that is available to admins
who can quickly take possible-compromise-situation under-control
probably at the cost of some functionality-loss until kernel is
patched and the mask is restored to default value.
The thing that makes me hesitate with this set is that it is a
permanent new feature to address what (I hope) is a temporary
problem.  What would you think about doing this as a stackable
(yama-style) LSM?
I'm not sure if automated tools could discover anything since these
changes should not alter behavior in any way.
Seems like there are two naive ways to do it, the first being to just
look at all code under ns_capable() plus code called from there.  It
seems like looking at the result of that could be fruitful.

-serge
Thread (25 messages) 25 messages, 7 authors, last reply 2017-11-10
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread / next series-diff position
kprevious message in thread / previous series-diff position
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help