Re: [PATCH RFC v2 4/6] proc: support mounting private procfs instances inside same pid namespace
From: Djalal Harouni <hidden>
Date: 2017-05-03 15:18:44
Also in:
linux-fsdevel, linux-security-module, lkml
On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 6:33 PM, Andy Lutomirski [off-list ref] wrote:
On Tue, May 2, 2017 at 7:29 AM, Djalal Harouni [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 12:13 AM, Andy Lutomirski [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Djalal Harouni [off-list ref] wrote:[...]quoted
quoted
We have to align procfs and modernize it to have a per mount context where at least the mount option do not propagate to all other mounts, then maybe we can continue to implement new features. One example is to require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the init user namespace on some /proc/* which are not pids and which are are not virtualized by design, or CAP_NET_ADMIN inside userns on the net bits that are virtualized, etc. These mount options won't propagate to previous mounts, and the system will continue to be usable. Ths patch introduces the new 'limit_pids' mount option as it was also suggesed by Andy Lutomirski [1]. When this option is passed we automatically create a private procfs instance. This is not the default behaviour since we do not want to break userspace and we do not want to provide different devices IDs by default, please see [1] for why.I think that calling the option to make a separate instance "limit_pids" is extremely counterintuitive.Ok.quoted
My strong preference would be to make proc *always* make a separate instance (unless it's a bind mount) and to make it work. If that means fudging stat() output, so be it.I also agree, but as said if we change stat(), userspace won't be able to notice if these two proc instances are really separated, the device ID is the only indication here.I re-read all the threads and I'm still not convinced I see why we need new_instance to be non-default. It's true that the device numbers of /proc/ns/* matter, but if you look (with stat -L, for example), they're *already* not tied to the procfs instance.
Hmm, indeed, so the namespace FDs point internally to the internal proc mount that is created during pidns initialization, this means NS_GET_PARENT ioctl won't change which is good, only things that relate on stat()ing other inodes may notice.
I'm okay with adding new_instance to be on the safe side, but I'd like it to be done in a way that we could make it become the default some day without breaking anything. This means that we need to be rather careful about how new_instance and hidepid interact.
Sounds good, from the devpts history it seems that "newinstance" was used to absorb new changes/updates easily, and it was made a no-op only recently with commit eedf265aa003b4 "devpts: Make each mount of devpts an independent filesystem." last year, where the initial introduction was via commit 2a1b2dc0c83bbfc24 "Enable multiple instances of devpts" in 2009 Starting from this: 1) "hidepid" works withe the "gid" membership option which is sticky, I would like to avoid this combination, plus 2) "hidepid" now changes the pid namespace option. With "newinstance" set: * "hidepid" instead of changing the pid namespace options, it will only affect the new procfs instance. * Changing "hidepid" value during a remount of a *private* procfs instance will only affect that procfs instance and not the pid namespace or the other shared procfs mounts. * "pids=ptraceable" makes /proc/ show only pids that the caller can ptrace. Together with NO_NEW_PRIVS set, it makes a good privacy measure. "pids=ptraceable" is also for *LSM* so we guarantee that there is a ptrace security hook there for LSMs and that there are no relations or exceptions between "pids=ptraceable" and "hidepid" / "gid" mount options. This will benefit Yama LSM later. * "pids=ptraceable" will take precedence over "hidepid" I assume defaulting later to new instances should continue to work, comments ? Thanks! -- tixxdz