Re: new ...at() flag: AT_NO_JUMPS

On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 1:30 AM, Al Viro [off-list ref] wrote:

On Mon, May 01, 2017 at 07:36:52PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:

quoted

Oh, nice!

It looks like this is somewhat similar to the old O_BENEATH proposal,
but because the intentions behind the proposals are different
(application sandboxing versus permitting an application to restrict its
own filesystem accesses), the semantics differ: AT_NO_JUMPS
doesn't prevent starting the path with "/", but does prevent mountpoint
traversal. Is that correct?

It prevents both, actually - I missed that in description, but this
        if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_JUMPS))
                return -ELOOP;
in nd_jump_root() affects absolute pathnames same way as it affects
absolute symlinks.

It's not quite O_BENEATH, and IMO it's saner that way - a/b/c/../d is
bloody well allowed, and so are relative symlinks that do not lead out of
the subtree.  If somebody has a good argument in favour of flat-out
ban on .. (_other_ than "other guys do it that way, and it doesn't need
to make sense 'cuz security!!1!!!", please), I'd be glad to hear it.

BTW, FreeBSD head now allows .. if it stays in subtree:
https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=308212