Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] task_isolation: support PR_TASK_ISOLATION_STRICT mode
From: Will Deacon <hidden>
Date: 2015-08-26 10:36:57
Also in:
lkml
Hi Chris, On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 08:55:52PM +0100, Chris Metcalf wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
With task_isolation mode, the task is in principle guaranteed not to be interrupted by the kernel, but only if it behaves. In particular, if it enters the kernel via system call, page fault, or any of a number of other synchronous traps, it may be unexpectedly exposed to long latencies. Add a simple flag that puts the process into a state where any such kernel entry is fatal. To allow the state to be entered and exited, we ignore the prctl() syscall so that we can clear the bit again later, and we ignore exit/exit_group to allow exiting the task without a pointless signal killing you as you try to do so. This change adds the syscall-detection hooks only for x86, arm64, and tile. The signature of context_tracking_exit() changes to report whether we, in fact, are exiting back to user space, so that we can track user exceptions properly separately from other kernel entries. Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <redacted> --- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +++++ arch/tile/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 ++ include/linux/context_tracking.h | 11 ++++++++--- include/linux/isolation.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + kernel/context_tracking.c | 9 ++++++--- kernel/isolation.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c index d882b833dbdb..e3d83a12f3cf 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <linux/regset.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/elf.h> +#include <linux/isolation.h> #include <asm/compat.h> #include <asm/debug-monitors.h>@@ -1150,6 +1151,10 @@ static void tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { + /* Ensure we report task_isolation violations in all circumstances. */ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NOHZ) && task_isolation_strict())
This is going to force us to check TIF_NOHZ on the syscall slowpath even when CONFIG_TASK_ISOLATION=n.
+ task_isolation_syscall(regs->syscallno); + /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
Here we have the usual priority problems with all the subsystems that hook into the syscall path. If a prctl is later rewritten to a different syscall, do you care about catching it? Either way, the comment about doing secure computing "first" needs fixing. Cheers, Will