Jeff King wrote:
It's not an identical prefix, but I think collision attacks generally
are along the lines of selecting two prefixes followed by garbage, and
then mutating the garbage on both sides. That would "work" in this case
(modulo the fact that git would complain about the NUL).
I haven't read the paper yet to see if that is the case here, though.
The current attack is an identical-prefix attack, not chosen-prefix, so
not quite to that point yet.
The MD5 chosen-prefix attack was 2^15 harder than the known-prefix attack,
but who knows if the numbers will be comprable for SHA1.
A related case is if you could stick a "cruft ...." header at the end of
the commit headers, and mutate its value (avoiding newlines). fsck
doesn't complain about that.
git log and git show don't show such cruft headers either.
BTW, the SHA attack only added ~128 bytes to the pdfs, not really a
huge amount of garbage.
--
see shy jo