Re: SHA1 collisions found

On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 9:35 AM, Joey Hess [off-list ref] wrote:

Attacks using this SHA1 break will look something more like:

We don't actually know what the break is, but it's likely that you
can't actually do what you think you can do:

* I push a "bad" object to a repo on github I set up under a
  pseudonym.
* I publish a "good" object in a commit and convince the maintainer to
  merge it.

It's not clear that the "good" object can be anything sane.

What you describe pretty much already requires a pre-image attack,
which the new attack is _not_.

The new attack doesn't have a controlled "good" case, you need two
different objects that both have "near-collision" blocks in the
middle. I don't know what the format of those near-collision blocks
are, but it's a big problem.

You blithely just say "I create a good object". It's not that simple.
If it was, this would be a pre-image attack.

So basically, the attack needs some kind of random binary garbage in
*both* objects in the middle.

That's why pdf's are the classic model for showing these attacks: it's
easy to insert garbage in the middle of a pdf that is invisible.

In a psf, you can just define a bitmap that you don't use for printing
- but you can use them to then make a decision about what to print -
making the printed version of the pdf look radically different in ways
that are not so much _directly_ about the invisible block itself.

              Linus