Re: [PATCH 2/3] x86/sev-es: Check if regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Date: 2021-02-17 18:01:06
Also in:
kvm, lkml, stable
On Wed, Feb 17, 2021 at 01:01:42PM +0100, Joerg Roedel wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
From: Joerg Roedel <redacted> The code in the NMI handler to adjust the #VC handler IST stack is needed in case an NMI hits when the #VC handler is still using its IST stack. But the check for this condition also needs to look if the regs->sp value is trusted, meaning it was not set by user-space. Extend the check to not use regs->sp when the NMI interrupted user-space code or the SYSCALL gap. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Fixes: 315562c9af3d5 ("x86/sev-es: Adjust #VC IST Stack on entering NMI handler") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <redacted> --- arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c index 84c1821819af..0df38b185d53 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c@@ -144,7 +144,9 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]); /* Make room on the IST stack */ - if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp)) + if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp) && + !user_mode(regs) && + !from_syscall_gap(regs))
Why not add those checks to on_vc_stack() directly? Because in it, you
can say:
on_vc_stack():
/* user mode rSP is not trusted */
if (user_mode())
return false;
/* ditto */
if (ip_within_syscall_gap())
return false;
...
?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
_______________________________________________
Virtualization mailing list
Virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/virtualization