Hello,

On Di, 2015-01-27 at 18:08 +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:

On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 05:02:31PM +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:

quoted

On Di, 2015-01-27 at 09:26 -0500, Vlad Yasevich wrote:

quoted

On 01/27/2015 08:47 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:

quoted

On Di, 2015-01-27 at 10:42 +0200, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:

quoted

On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 02:47:54AM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote:

quoted

On Mon, 2015-01-26 at 09:37 -0500, Vladislav Yasevich wrote:

quoted

If the IPv6 fragment id has not been set and we perform
fragmentation due to UFO, select a new fragment id.
When we store the fragment id into skb_shinfo, set the bit
in the skb so we can re-use the selected id.
This preserves the behavior of UFO packets generated on the
host and solves the issue of id generation for packet sockets
and tap/macvtap devices.

This patch moves ipv6_select_ident() back in to the header file.  
It also provides the helper function that sets skb_shinfo() frag
id and sets the bit.

It also makes sure that we select the fragment id when doing
just gso validation, since it's possible for the packet to
come from an untrusted source (VM) and be forwarded through
a UFO enabled device which will expect the fragment id.

CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <redacted>
---
 include/linux/skbuff.h |  3 ++-
 include/net/ipv6.h     |  2 ++
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c  |  4 ++--
 net/ipv6/output_core.c |  9 ++++++++-
 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 10 +++++++++-
 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index 85ab7d7..3ad5203 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h

@@ -605,7 +605,8 @@ struct sk_buff {
 	__u8			ipvs_property:1;
 	__u8			inner_protocol_type:1;
 	__u8			remcsum_offload:1;
-	/* 3 or 5 bit hole */
+	__u8			ufo_fragid_set:1;

[...]

Doesn't the flag belong in struct skb_shared_info, rather than struct
sk_buff?  Otherwise this looks fine.

Ben.

Hmm we seem to be out of tx flags.
Maybe ip6_frag_id == 0 should mean "not set".

Maybe that is the best idea. Definitely the ufo_fragid_set bit should
move into the skb_shared_info area.

That's what I originally wanted to do, but had to move and grow txflags thus
skb_shinfo ended up growing.  I wanted to avoid that, so stole an skb flag.

I considered treating fragid == 0 as unset, but a 0 fragid is perfectly valid
from the protocol perspective and could actually be generated by the id generator
functions.  This may cause us to call the id generation multiple times.

Are there plans in the long run to let virtio_net transmit auxiliary
data to the other end so we can clean all of this this up one day?

I don't like the whole situation: looking into the virtio_net headers
just adding a field for ipv6 fragmentation ids to those small structs
seems bloated, not doing it feels incorrect. :/

Thoughts?

Bye,
Hannes

I'm not sure - what will be achieved by generating the IDs guest side as
opposed to host side?  It's certainly harder to get hold of entropy
guest-side.

It is not only about entropy but about uniqueness. Also fragmentation
ids should not be discoverable, so there are several aspects:

I see fragmentation id generation still as security critical:
When Eric patched the frag id generator in 04ca6973f7c1a0d ("ip: make IP
identifiers less predictable") I could patch my kernels and use the
patch regardless of the machine being virtualized or not. It was not
dependent on the hypervisor. I think that is the same reasoning why we
don't support TOE.

If we use one generator in the hypervisor in an openstack alike setting,
the host deals with quite a lot of overlay networks. A lot of default
configurations use the same addresses internally, so on the hypervisor
the frag id generators would interfere by design.

I could come up with an attack scenario for DNS servers (again :) ):

You are sitting next to a DNS server on the same hypervisor and can send
packets without source validation (because that is handled later on in
case of openvswitch when the packet is put into the corresponding
overlay network). You emit a gso packet with the same source and
destination addresses as the DNS server would do and would get an
fragmentation id which is linearly (+ time delta) incremented depending
on the source and destination address. With such a leak you could start
trying attack and spoof DNS responses (fragmentation attacks etc.).

See also details on such kind of attacks in the description of commit
04ca6973f7c1a0d.

AFAIK IETF tried with IPv6 to push fragmentation id generation to the
end hosts, that's also the reason for the introduction of atomic
fragments (which are now being rolled back ;) ).

Still it is better to generate a frag id on the hypervisor than just
sending a 0, so I am ok with this change, albeit not happy.

Thanks,
Hannes