6.1-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

commit a458b2902115b26a25d67393b12ddd57d1216aaa upstream.

To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time.
Use the appropriate helper function for this.

Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250818202724.15713-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <net/seg6.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
 #include <net/seg6_hmac.h>

@@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_bu
 	if (seg6_hmac_compute(hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, hmac_output))
 		return false;
 
-	if (memcmp(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN) != 0)
+	if (crypto_memneq(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;