[PATCH 2/5] vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls
From: Adam Borowski <hidden>
Date: 2017-06-03 07:35:22
Also in:
lkml
Subsystem:
the rest, tty layer and serial drivers · Maintainers:
Linus Torvalds, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Jiri Slaby
Only read access is checked before this call. Actually, at the moment this is not an issue, as every in-tree arch does the same manual checks for VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE, relying on the MMU to tell them apart, but this wasn't the case in the past and may happen again on some odd arch in the future. If anyone cares about 3.7 and earlier, this is a security hole (untested) on real 80386 CPUs. Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <redacted> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7- --- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
index 9309c7da660a..2ebaba16f785 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c@@ -2709,13 +2709,13 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg) * related to the kernel should not use this. */ data = vt_get_shift_state(); - ret = __put_user(data, p); + ret = put_user(data, p); break; case TIOCL_GETMOUSEREPORTING: console_lock(); /* May be overkill */ data = mouse_reporting(); console_unlock(); - ret = __put_user(data, p); + ret = put_user(data, p); break; case TIOCL_SETVESABLANK: console_lock();
@@ -2724,7 +2724,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg) break; case TIOCL_GETKMSGREDIRECT: data = vt_get_kmsg_redirect(); - ret = __put_user(data, p); + ret = put_user(data, p); break; case TIOCL_SETKMSGREDIRECT: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
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2.11.0