On Tue 10-07-12 16:52:26, Ben Hutchings wrote:
On Mon, Jul 09, 2012 at 03:31:42PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
quoted
3.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
commit adee11b2085bee90bd8f4f52123ffb07882d6256 upstream.
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <redacted>
---
fs/udf/super.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/udf/super.c b/fs/udf/super.c
index 9da6f4e..ce911f5 100644
--- a/fs/udf/super.c
+++ b/fs/udf/super.c
[...]
quoted
@@ -1232,13 +1233,20 @@ static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
return 1;
BUG_ON(ident != TAG_IDENT_LVD);
lvd = (struct logicalVolDesc *)bh->b_data;
+ table_len = le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);
+ if (sizeof(*lvd) + table_len > sb->s_blocksize) {
[...]
I don't think this is sufficient, unless there has been some prior
validation of lvd->mapTableLength. On a 32-bit machine, the addition
may overflow. The untrusted value has to be validated before doing
any arithmetic on it, e.g.:
if (table_len > sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(*lv)) {
Yeah, thanks for spotting this! I've queued the attached patch. I don't
find this really pressing so I'll push it in the next merge window. OK?
Honza
--
Jan Kara [off-list ref]
SUSE Labs, CR