On Mon, 26 Oct 2026 15:05:42 -0700 Todd Bert Freed wrote:
quoted
The PSP ICV doesn't cover the outer IPv6 header or its extension headers.
An on-path attacker could take a captured PSP packet, insert one of these
headers, and set saddr to an address they control. This assumes the
device authenticates such packets, which this patch's premise implies.
Several of those handlers reply with an ICMPv6 error that quotes the
packet. With default sysctls, this happens for an unrecognized routing
header type (type 0, for example) with segments_left != 0:
Before this patch, all of these packets were dropped at the is_udp check.
Forwarding the decrypted skb itself looks blocked by
sk_validate_xmit_skb() ("unencrypted skb with no associated socket -
dropping"). That leaves the ICMP error path as the open channel.
Agree with this finding.
If we're leaking cleartext in ICMP responses that's also a problem
for TLS offload. We should fix that, based on skb->decrypt. right?
BTW I haven't looked closely but is there no existing helper that
would give you the ability to walk the extension headers?