On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 at 4:50 PM Jason Gunthorpe [off-list ref] wrote:
On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 at 04:30:25PM +0200, Luigi Rizzo wrote:
Just addressing the last part:
...The CC stuff seems
actively dangerous. Unconditionally always using CC shared memory for
skbs is completely security wrong. What I have traffic flowing inside
my VM between containers or something? Does this end up putting those
skbs in shared memory even if they never hit a physical NIC? Same
with a TDISP capable NIC, does this unconditionally degrade its
security?
the current series was RFC and "unconditional" just to show the concept.
My next version (a trivial change, really) is fully opt-in on a
per-device and per direction basis.
The unencrypted (or pre-mapped) buffers will only be used for traffic
that hits a device that opted in, and only for the directions that were
opted in. So we can finely tune the configuration based on hw capabilities,
threat model and performance requirements.
cheers
luigi