__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() currently installs untrusted NEEDS_CSUM
metadata into the skb with skb_partial_csum_set() and only then checks
that the resulting transport offset is beyond the minimum network
header length.
Validate the raw csum_start first. Successful packets are unchanged,
but malformed metadata is rejected before it can transition the skb to
CHECKSUM_PARTIAL state. This deliberately does not replace the broader
ingress validation being discussed for virtio checksum metadata; it only
narrows the state transition at the existing check.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260922030310.8684-2-habte.yibelo@gmail.com/ (local)
Signed-off-by: tonegawa <redacted>
---
include/linux/virtio_net.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
index d6466f96cdd00c..c8180f1222f492 100644
--- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h
+++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ static inline int __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct
sk_buff *skb,
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, needed))
return -EINVAL;
- if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
+ if (start < nh_min_len)
return -EINVAL;
- if (skb_transport_offset(skb) < nh_min_len)
+ if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
return -EINVAL;
nh_min_len = skb_transport_offset(skb);
--
2.51.0