Re: [PATCH 1/1] nfc: nci: ignore unexpected CORE_RESET_NTF
From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Date: 2026-09-21 12:58:31
Also in:
lkml, oe-linux-nfc, stable
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible. Full review at: https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260918013337.82214-2-ndaugoing@gmail.com?part=1 --- nfc: nci: ignore unexpected CORE_RESET_NTF This adds an NCI_RESET_PENDING flag that is set when CORE_RESET_CMD is sent and cleared on request completion, so that CORE_RESET_NTF is only handled while a reset request is outstanding. Unexpected notifications are dropped with a ratelimited warning. A few questions about the new gate below.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/core.c b/net/nfc/nci/core.c index 5f46c4b5720f6..5a90591cd9af7 100644 --- a/net/nfc/nci/core.c +++ b/net/nfc/nci/core.c@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ static int __nci_request(struct nci_dev *ndev, } ndev->req_status = ndev->req_result = 0; + clear_bit(NCI_RESET_PENDING, &ndev->flags); return rc; }
[Severity: Medium] Since the flag carries no generation or sequence identity, can a CORE_RESET_NTF belonging to an abandoned reset be matched against a later reset attempt? If reset attempt #1 times out here, the flag is cleared, but the notification may already be sitting in nci_rx_work. The failure path in nci_open_device() purges the queue but does not drain the worker: /* Init failed, cleanup */ skb_queue_purge(&ndev->cmd_q); skb_queue_purge(&ndev->rx_q); skb_queue_purge(&ndev->tx_q); ndev->ops->close(ndev); Only nci_close_device() flushes ndev->rx_wq, and it does that after dropping req_lock; the exported nci_core_reset() path purges nothing. If userspace then retries NFC_CMD_DEV_UP (or a driver calls nci_core_reset()), nci_reset_req() sets the same bit again and the stale frame is accepted by test_and_clear_bit() in nci_core_reset_ntf_packet(), overwriting ndev->nci_ver / manufact_* from the old frame and completing reset #2 with NCI_STATUS_OK before its own CORE_RESET_RSP has been seen. The later real response can then complete the following CORE_INIT request.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -163,6 +164,8 @@ static void nci_reset_req(struct nci_dev *ndev, const void *opt) { struct nci_core_reset_cmd cmd; + set_bit(NCI_RESET_PENDING, &ndev->flags); + cmd.reset_type = NCI_RESET_TYPE_RESET_CONFIG; nci_send_cmd(ndev, NCI_OP_CORE_RESET_CMD, 1, &cmd); }
[Severity: Medium]
Is a single bit enough synchronisation between the two contexts here?
nci_reset_req()/__nci_request() run in process context under
ndev->req_lock, while nci_core_reset_ntf_packet() runs from nci_rx_work on
ndev->rx_wq, and the two share no lock.
The check and the use are not atomic. After test_and_clear_bit() succeeds in
nci_core_reset_ntf_packet(), the worker can be preempted before it reaches:
ndev->nci_ver = ntf->nci_ver;
...
nci_req_complete(ndev, NCI_STATUS_OK);
If the reset it belonged to times out in that window, __nci_request() zeroes
req_status and returns -ETIMEDOUT, and a new request can be armed
(req_status = NCI_REQ_PEND). nci_req_complete() only looks at the global
status:
if (ndev->req_status == NCI_REQ_PEND) {
ndev->req_result = result;
ndev->req_status = NCI_REQ_DONE;
complete(&ndev->req_completion);
}
so the resumed worker completes the new request as successful, and writes
ndev->nci_ver while nci_open_device() may be reading it:
if (ndev->nci_ver & NCI_VER_2_MASK)
opt = &nci_init_v2_cmd;
Would tying the notification to a request generation, or serialising the
flag test with request start/teardown, close this?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c index f5c9a8ab7ec10..b7fa8980804da 100644 --- a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c +++ b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ static int nci_core_reset_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev, if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nci_core_reset_ntf)) return -EINVAL; + if (!test_and_clear_bit(NCI_RESET_PENDING, &ndev->flags)) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("unexpected CORE_RESET_NTF\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } +
[Severity: High]
Does returning -EINVAL here break the fdp firmware update handshake?
In nci_ntf_packet() a non-zero return skips the driver dispatch:
case NCI_OP_CORE_RESET_NTF:
if (nci_core_reset_ntf_packet(ndev, skb))
goto end;
break;
...
nci_core_ntf_packet(ndev, ntf_opcode, skb);
end:
kfree_skb(skb);
nci_core_ntf_packet() is the only dispatcher for driver core_ops handlers,
and drivers/nfc/fdp registers one for exactly this notification:
static const struct nci_driver_ops fdp_core_ops[] = {
...
{
.opcode = NCI_OP_CORE_RESET_NTF,
.ntf = fdp_nci_core_reset_ntf_packet,
},
};
That hook is what wakes the patch path:
static int fdp_nci_core_reset_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct fdp_nci_info *info = nci_get_drvdata(ndev);
info->setup_reset_ntf = 1;
wake_up(&info->setup_wq);
The notification it waits for is unsolicited, as the comment in
fdp_nci_send_patch() describes:
* command with NCI_PATCH_TYPE_EOT parameter. The device will send a
* NFCC_PATCH_NTF packet and a NCI_OP_CORE_RESET_NTF packet.
At that point the last request was nci_prop_cmd(NCI_OP_PROP_PATCH_OID),
whose completion also clears NCI_RESET_PENDING in __nci_request(), so the
flag is clear and the notification is dropped. Would
fdp_nci_patch_otp()/fdp_nci_patch_ram() then block forever in
wait_event_interruptible(info->setup_wq, info->setup_reset_ntf);
with no timeout? That wait runs inside ndev->ops->setup(), which
nci_open_device() calls while holding ndev->req_lock, so a stalled task
would also block nci_close_device()/nci_unregister_device() and keep the
request_firmware() buffers pinned because fdp_nci_release_firmware() is
never reached.
Would it be enough to skip only the core-level bookkeeping (drop the state
update and break) instead of aborting the whole notification pipeline?
[Severity: Medium]
Should the decision use ntf->reset_trigger rather than a host-side flag?
The notification carries the discriminator itself:
struct nci_core_reset_ntf {
u8 reset_trigger;
u8 config_status;
...
but the accept/reject decision is taken before the packet is even parsed,
and reset_trigger is never read in the handler.
That cuts both ways. A genuine NFCC-initiated reset arriving outside a reset
request is discarded with only a warning, even though the controller has
returned to its initial state (RF discovery stopped, logical connections and
credits destroyed, routing table cleared), and the driver hook does not run
either.
Conversely, a spontaneous notification (reset_trigger not indicating
CORE_RESET_CMD) that happens to land inside the reset window is still
accepted, still overwrites ndev->nci_ver / manufact_id /
manufact_specific_info, and still calls:
nci_req_complete(ndev, NCI_STATUS_OK);
Is the intended bug class actually eliminated, or only narrowed by timing?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/rsp.c b/net/nfc/nci/rsp.c index b0ab4f5acbce8..a4bfe14372a81 100644 --- a/net/nfc/nci/rsp.c +++ b/net/nfc/nci/rsp.c@@ -32,14 +32,19 @@ static void nci_core_reset_rsp_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev, pr_debug("status 0x%x\n", rsp->status); + if (rsp->status != NCI_STATUS_OK) { + clear_bit(NCI_RESET_PENDING, &ndev->flags); + nci_req_complete(ndev, rsp->status); + return; + } +
[Severity: Medium]
Should the response handler test NCI_RESET_PENDING too, rather than only
clearing it?
nci_rsp_packet() dispatches purely by opcode with no correlation to the
outstanding command:
switch (rsp_opcode) {
case NCI_OP_CORE_RESET_RSP:
nci_core_reset_rsp_packet(ndev, skb);
break;
and nci_req_complete() only checks the global status, so a stray or delayed
CORE_RESET_RSP still completes whatever unrelated request is in flight
(CORE_INIT, RF_DISCOVER, CONN_CREATE) - the desynchronisation the commit
message sets out to remove.
This new block also widens that surface. Before the patch a 1-byte (NCI 2.x)
response completed nothing at all; now the status test runs before any length
discrimination, so a single 3-byte control frame (header plus a non-OK
status, accepted by nci_valid_size() since the declared payload is non-zero)
completes an unrelated request with a controller-chosen status.
There is also a mirror case: because the flag is cleared here without being
validated, a stray CORE_RESET_RSP during a genuine NCI 2.x reset disarms the
new guard, and the real CORE_RESET_NTF is then rejected as unexpected, so
the reset stalls until NCI_RESET_TIMEOUT.
/* Handle NCI 1.x ver */
if (skb->len != 1) {
- if (rsp->status == NCI_STATUS_OK) {
- ndev->nci_ver = rsp->nci_ver;
- pr_debug("nci_ver 0x%x, config_status 0x%x\n",
- rsp->nci_ver, rsp->config_status);
- }
+ ndev->nci_ver = rsp->nci_ver;
+ pr_debug("nci_ver 0x%x, config_status 0x%x\n",
+ rsp->nci_ver, rsp->config_status);
+ clear_bit(NCI_RESET_PENDING, &ndev->flags);
nci_req_complete(ndev, rsp->status);
}
}
[Severity: Low]
This is a pre-existing issue and not introduced by this patch, but does
"skb->len != 1" read rsp->config_status past the received payload?
config_status is the third byte:
struct nci_core_reset_rsp {
__u8 status;
__u8 nci_ver;
__u8 config_status;
} __packed;
and nci_valid_size() only requires the declared payload to be present and
non-zero:
if (skb->len < hdr_size ||
skb->len < hdr_size + nci_plen(skb->data)) {
return false;
}
if (!nci_plen(skb->data)) {
so a CORE_RESET_RSP with plen == 2 and status == NCI_STATUS_OK reaches this
block and the pr_debug() reads one byte beyond the payload. The patch keeps
the same condition (status == OK and len != 1), so this is unchanged
behaviour; would an explicit length check for the 3-byte form be worth
adding while this function is being touched?