Re: [PATCH net-next v3 10/10] net: dsa: microchip: add periodic output support for the KSZ8463
From: netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org
Date: 2026-09-10 10:30:19
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Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider: Critical: 0 · High: 1 (2) · Medium: 2 · Low: 1 - [High] KSZ8463 advertises 12 periodic-output channels (.n_pins = 12, .n_per_out = 12, copied into caps by ksz8463_ptp_set_caps()) while the… - [Medium] ksz8463_ptp_enable_perout() is not transactional: it calls ksz8463_ptp_tou_reset(dev, request->index) (stopping an already… - [Medium] ksz8463_ptp_configure_perout() dereferences dev->ptp_data.pin_config[index]… - [Low] ksz8463_ptp_set_caps() (drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c:1335) does not set ptp_data->caps.supported_perout_flags, while the code… Pre-existing issues: - [High] The new KSZ8463 settime/adjtime paths funnel into ksz_ptp_prepare_restart_perout(), whose catch-up arithmetic can… - [High] A denormalized periodic-output period is accepted as zero nanoseconds and later causes a kernel divide-by-zero or an infinite… -- net: dsa: microchip: add periodic output support for the KSZ8463 This adds KSZ8463 specific periodic output handling: per-unit trigger configuration registers, a smaller maximum pulse width, and a new set of ksz8463_* PTP callbacks installed by ksz8463_ptp_set_caps(). The chip data now advertises 12 pins and 12 periodic output channels. A few questions below about the new paths.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_common.c b/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_common.c index 041bb4f963659..9e234ad71b723 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_common.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_common.c@@ -1161,6 +1161,8 @@ const struct ksz_chip_data ksz_switch_chips[] = { .supports_mii = {false, false, true}, .supports_rmii = {false, false, true}, .internal_phy = {true, true, false}, + .n_pins = 12, + .n_per_out = 12, },
[Severity: High]
Twelve periodic output channels are advertised here, but struct
ksz_ptp_data still keeps only one set of perout state (a single tou_mode,
one perout_target_time_first, one perout_period), and the restart helper
always rebuilds a request for channel 0:
drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c:ksz_ptp_prepare_restart_perout() {
...
request->index = 0;
request->flags = 0;
return 0;
}
Userspace can map pin 3 to PTP_PF_PEROUT chan 3 (ptp_set_pinfunc() only
checks chan < n_per_out, and ksz_ptp_verify_pin() accepts any PEROUT
pin/chan) and then arm PTP_PEROUT_REQUEST with index 3, which makes
ksz8463_ptp_enable_perout() program trigger unit 3 and set tou_mode =
KSZ_PTP_TOU_PEROUT.
The next clock_settime() then walks:
ksz8463_ptp_settime() -> ksz8463_ptp_restart_perout() ->
ksz_ptp_prepare_restart_perout() (index = 0) ->
ksz8463_ptp_enable_perout() -> ksz_ptp_get_pin() ->
ptp_find_pin(clock, PTP_PF_PEROUT, 0)
With no pin mapped to chan 0 that returns -1 and ksz_ptp_get_pin() returns
-EINVAL. Does that mean every clock_settime()/clock_adjtime() fails for as
long as a perout is armed on a channel other than 0?
And because the failure takes the goto unlock path after
__ksz_ptp_settime() has already loaded the hardware RTC, is
ptp_data->clock_time (used by ksz_tstamp_reconstruct()) left behind until
ksz_ptp_do_aux_work() happens to run?
If some pin is mapped to chan 0, the restart resets and re-arms unit 0 with
the last stored period and target instead, while the unit that is actually
running keeps its old absolute 32-bit target and is never re-armed. Is
that intended?
There are two related effects: enabling a second channel overwrites the
stored period/target of the first, and disabling any single channel sets
the global tou_mode to KSZ_PTP_TOU_IDLE, after which clock steps take the
IDLE branch and the units still set in KSZ8463_TOU_EN are never
resynchronised. Should the perout state become per-channel before
n_per_out = 12 is exposed?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c b/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c index 0a77b46cfad25..d33034892a8f6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -120,6 +132,28 @@ static int ksz_ptp_tou_target_time_set(struct ksz_device *dev, return 0; } +static int ksz8463_ptp_tou_start(struct ksz_device *dev, u8 unit) +{ + u16 data; + int ret; + + ret = ksz_rmw16(dev, KSZ8463_TOU_EN, BIT(unit), BIT(unit)); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = ksz_read16(dev, KSZ8463_TOU_ACTIVE, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (!(data & BIT(unit))) { + dev_err(dev->dev, "%s: Trigger unit%d error!\n", __func__, + unit); + return -EIO; + } + + return 0; +} +
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -147,6 +181,56 @@ static int ksz_ptp_tou_start(struct ksz_device *dev, u8 unit) return 0; } +static int ksz8463_ptp_configure_perout(struct ksz_device *dev, + u32 cycle_width_ns, u32 pulse_width_ns, + struct timespec64 const *target_time, + u8 index) +{ + struct ptp_pin_desc *pin = &dev->ptp_data.pin_config[index]; + u16 cfg_base = KSZ8463_TRIG1_CFG + KSZ8463_TRIGN_CFG_SIZE * pin->chan;
[Severity: Medium]
Is pin_config safe to read here with only ptp_data->lock held? pin->chan
selects which trigger unit's register block gets rewritten, and
drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h documents the lock for that array as:
struct mutex pincfg_mux; /* protect concurrent info->pin_config access */
The core holds pincfg_mux around ->enable() only, not around
->settime64()/->adjtime(). So on the new paths:
CPU0: clock_settime() -> ksz8463_ptp_settime() (takes ptp_data->lock only)
-> ksz8463_ptp_restart_perout() -> ksz8463_ptp_enable_perout()
-> ksz_ptp_get_pin() -> ptp_find_pin() -> ksz8463_ptp_configure_perout()
reads pin_config[index].chan / .index
CPU1: PTP_PIN_SETFUNC -> ptp_set_pinfunc() (holds pincfg_mux) writes
if (pin1) {
ptp_disable_pinfunc(info, func, chan);
pin1->func = PTP_PF_NONE;
pin1->chan = 0;
}
...
pin2->func = func;
pin2->chan = chan;
Those stores happen after ptp_disable_pinfunc() has already returned from
ksz8463_ptp_enable() and released ptp_data->lock, and for func ==
PTP_PF_NONE no ->enable() call happens at all, so ptp_data->lock does not
close the window. Can cfg_base then point at a different, possibly
active, trigger unit than the one reset and enabled via request->index and
silently rewrite its configuration?
Note that taking pincfg_mux inside ptp_data->lock would invert the order
the core establishes in ptp_set_pinfunc() -> ptp_disable_pinfunc() ->
ksz8463_ptp_enable(); caching the pin/chan under ptp_data->lock at
enable() time looks like it would avoid that.
+ u16 data; + int ret; + + /* Hardware has only 32 bit */ + if ((target_time->tv_sec & 0xffffffff) != target_time->tv_sec) + return -EINVAL; + + data = KSZ8463_NOTIFY_BIT | + FIELD_PREP(KSZ8463_PATTERN_M, TRIG_POS_PERIOD) | + pin->index; + ret = ksz_write16(dev, cfg_base + KSZ8463_PATTERN_OFF, data); + if (ret) + return ret;
[ ... ]
+ return 0; +} +
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -241,6 +325,58 @@ static u64 ksz_ptp_compute_perout_pulse(struct ksz_device *dev, return min_t(u64, req_pulse_width_ns, max_pulse_width); } +static int ksz8463_ptp_enable_perout(struct ksz_device *dev, + struct ptp_perout_request const *request, + int on) +{ + struct ksz_ptp_data *ptp_data = &dev->ptp_data; + u64 cycle_width_ns; + u64 pulse_width_ns; + int pin; + int ret; + + pin = ksz_ptp_get_pin(dev, request); + if (pin < 0) + return pin; + + ret = ksz8463_ptp_tou_reset(dev, request->index); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (!on) { + ptp_data->tou_mode = KSZ_PTP_TOU_IDLE; + return 0; + } + ret = ksz_ptp_compute_perout_cycle(dev, request, &cycle_width_ns); + if (ret) + return ret;
[Severity: Medium]
Is there a way back out of this sequence when a request is rejected? The
running unit is reset before the request is validated, and
ksz_ptp_compute_perout_cycle() overwrites the saved schedule before it can
reject the period:
drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c:ksz_ptp_compute_perout_cycle() {
ptp_data->perout_target_time_first.tv_sec = request->start.sec;
...
*cycle_width_ns = timespec64_to_ns(&ptp_data->perout_period);
if ((*cycle_width_ns & TRIG_CYCLE_WIDTH_M) != *cycle_width_ns) {
*cycle_width_ns = 0;
return -EINVAL;
}
}
So with a perout already running, a PTP_PEROUT_REQUEST carrying a period
whose ns value does not fit 32 bits (period.sec >= 5) resets trigger unit
N, stores the rejected start/period, and returns -EINVAL, while tou_mode
stays KSZ_PTP_TOU_PEROUT from the previous successful enable. Does every
later clock_settime()/clock_adjtime() then take the PEROUT branch, call
ksz8463_ptp_restart_perout() with the rejected parameters, fail again, and
jump to unlock after the RTC has already been written but before
ptp_data->clock_time is updated?
The same applies to the -EINVAL/-ERANGE returns from
ksz_ptp_tou_pulse_verify(), the 32-bit target check in
ksz8463_ptp_configure_perout(), any regmap error, and the -EIO from
ksz8463_ptp_tou_start().
Related: ksz8463_ptp_tou_start() sets KSZ8463_TOU_EN before reading
KSZ8463_TOU_ACTIVE and does not clear the enable bit when the read fails
or ACTIVE is not set, so does an operation reported as -EIO leave the unit
enabled in hardware?
+ pulse_width_ns = ksz_ptp_compute_perout_pulse(dev, request, + KSZ8463_MAX_PULSE_WIDTH); + + ret = ksz_ptp_tou_pulse_verify(pulse_width_ns, + KSZ8463_TRIG_PULSE_WIDTH_M); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = ksz8463_ptp_configure_perout(dev, cycle_width_ns, pulse_width_ns, + &ptp_data->perout_target_time_first, + pin); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = ksz_ptp_tou_gpio(dev); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = ksz8463_ptp_tou_start(dev, request->index); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ptp_data->tou_mode = KSZ_PTP_TOU_PEROUT; + + return 0; +} +
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -845,6 +981,18 @@ static int ksz_ptp_restart_perout(struct ksz_device *dev) return ksz_ptp_enable_perout(dev, &request, 1); } +static int ksz8463_ptp_restart_perout(struct ksz_device *dev) +{ + struct ptp_perout_request request; + int ret; + + ret = ksz_ptp_prepare_restart_perout(dev, &request); + if (ret) + return ret;
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but the helper reached from here
truncates the catch-up quotient to 32 bits, and this adds a second entry
point into it:
drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz_ptp.c:ksz_ptp_prepare_restart_perout() {
unsigned int count;
...
if (first_ns < now_ns) {
count = div_u64(now_ns - first_ns, period_ns);
next_ns = first_ns + count * period_ns;
} else {
next_ns = first_ns;
}
/* Ensure 100 ms guard time prior next event */
while (next_ns < now_ns + 100000000)
next_ns += period_ns;
}
count is only unsigned int, so once the true number of elapsed periods
passes 2^32, next_ns is left roughly 2^32 * period_ns in the past and the
guard loop advances one period per iteration, with ptp_data->lock held, in
ioctl context, and without cond_resched().
Small periods are accepted (TRIG_CYCLE_WIDTH_M is GENMASK(31, 0), and a
1 us period yields a 500 ns pulse that passes ksz_ptp_tou_pulse_verify()),
so a perout with a 1 us period armed a day earlier gives a true quotient
around 8.6e10. Can the next clock_settime() ->
ksz8463_ptp_settime() -> ksz8463_ptp_restart_perout() then spin for that
many iterations under the PTP mutex, producing RCU stalls or soft lockups
and blocking every other PTP operation on the device?
Write access to /dev/ptpN is enough to reach both steps, since posix
dynamic clocks only require FMODE_WRITE. Would widening count, or
bounding the accepted period, be worth doing here?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue in the same shared helper, but the new
KSZ8463 clock update paths make it reachable for this chip too: a
denormalized period is accepted as zero nanoseconds.
PTP_PEROUT_REQUEST does not check that struct ptp_clock_time is
normalized, and the core enables the output because the fields are
nonzero:
drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:ptp_perout_request() {
...
return ops->enable(ops, &req, perout->period.sec || perout->period.nsec);
}
So period.sec = -1 with period.nsec = 1000000000 reaches
ksz8463_ptp_enable_perout() with on = 1, ksz_ptp_compute_perout_cycle()
stores those raw fields into ptp_data->perout_period, timespec64_to_ns()
is 0, and 0 passes both the TRIG_CYCLE_WIDTH_M test and
ksz_ptp_tou_pulse_verify().
With a stored period of 0 and tou_mode still KSZ_PTP_TOU_PEROUT from an
earlier successful enable, the next clock_settime()/clock_adjtime() reaches
ksz_ptp_prepare_restart_perout():
if (first_ns < now_ns) {
count = div_u64(now_ns - first_ns, period_ns);
Does this divide by zero and Oops with ptp_data->lock held? And in the
other branch, does
while (next_ns < now_ns + 100000000)
next_ns += period_ns;
add zero forever? Would a normalized, strictly positive period check in
ksz_ptp_compute_perout_cycle() cover both cases?
+ + return ksz8463_ptp_enable_perout(dev, &request, 1); +} +
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -871,6 +1019,41 @@ static int __ksz_ptp_settime(struct ksz_device *dev, return 0; } +static int ksz8463_ptp_settime(struct ptp_clock_info *ptp, + const struct timespec64 *ts) +{ + struct ksz_ptp_data *ptp_data = ptp_caps_to_data(ptp); + struct ksz_device *dev = ptp_data_to_ksz_dev(ptp_data); + int ret; + + mutex_lock(&ptp_data->lock); + + ret = __ksz_ptp_settime(dev, ts); + if (ret) + goto unlock; + + switch (ptp_data->tou_mode) { + case KSZ_PTP_TOU_IDLE: + break; + + case KSZ_PTP_TOU_PEROUT: + ret = ksz8463_ptp_restart_perout(dev); + if (ret) + goto unlock; + + break; + } + + spin_lock_bh(&ptp_data->clock_lock); + ptp_data->clock_time = *ts; + spin_unlock_bh(&ptp_data->clock_lock); + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&ptp_data->lock); + + return ret; +} +
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -1095,6 +1332,27 @@ static int ksz_ptp_start_clock(struct ksz_device *dev) return 0; } +void ksz8463_ptp_set_caps(struct dsa_switch *ds) +{ + struct ksz_device *dev = ds->priv; + struct ksz_ptp_data *ptp_data; + + ptp_data = &dev->ptp_data; + + ptp_data->caps.owner = THIS_MODULE; + snprintf(ptp_data->caps.name, 16, "Microchip Clock"); + ptp_data->caps.max_adj = KSZ_MAX_DRIFT_CORR; + ptp_data->caps.gettime64 = ksz_ptp_gettime; + ptp_data->caps.settime64 = ksz8463_ptp_settime; + ptp_data->caps.adjfine = ksz_ptp_adjfine; + ptp_data->caps.adjtime = ksz8463_ptp_adjtime; + ptp_data->caps.do_aux_work = ksz_ptp_do_aux_work; + ptp_data->caps.enable = ksz8463_ptp_enable; + ptp_data->caps.verify = ksz_ptp_verify_pin; + ptp_data->caps.n_pins = dev->info->n_pins; + ptp_data->caps.n_per_out = dev->info->n_per_out; +} +
[Severity: Low]
supported_perout_flags is not set here, while the path installed by this
function implements PTP_PEROUT_DUTY_CYCLE: ksz_ptp_get_pin() only rejects
flags outside PTP_PEROUT_DUTY_CYCLE, and
ksz_ptp_compute_perout_pulse() consumes request->on:
if (request->flags & PTP_PEROUT_DUTY_CYCLE)
return request->on.sec * NSEC_PER_SEC + request->on.nsec;
The core rejects the ioctl before ->enable() runs:
drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:ptp_perout_request() {
if (perout->flags & ~ops->supported_perout_flags)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
So does every PTP_PEROUT_REQUEST2 with PTP_PEROUT_DUTY_CYCLE fail with
-EOPNOTSUPP, leaving the duty cycle handling unreachable? The same
omission exists in ksz_ptp_set_caps(), so the KSZ8463 is no worse than the
other chips, but should the new initializer either set
supported_perout_flags = PTP_PEROUT_DUTY_CYCLE or drop the duty cycle
handling?
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260908-ksz-perout-v3-0-6722a3f1ca75%40bootlin.com