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COOLING6d

[PATCH v4 02/14] NFSD: validate transport name in listener_set before serv creation

From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Date: 2026-08-31 16:15:40
Also in: linux-kselftest, linux-nfs, lkml
Subsystem: filesystems (vfs and infrastructure), kernel nfsd, sunrpc, and lockd servers, the rest · Maintainers: Alexander Viro, Christian Brauner, Chuck Lever, Jeff Layton, Linus Torvalds

nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() holds nfsd_mutex for the whole listener
teardown and rebuild. The code checks NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME for
presence only, and not for content. An arbitrary name therefore reaches
svc_xprt_create_from_sa(). There, a name that matches no registered class
calls request_module("svc%s", name). That call is a TASK_KILLABLE usermode
helper upcall, and it runs under nfsd_mutex.

Check the name against the classes that NFSD can create: tcp, udp and
rdma. The check goes in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(), which runs before
the code takes nfsd_mutex. The rejection names the offending attribute
through extack, since -EPROTONOSUPPORT on its own does not say which
entry carried the bad name.

This narrows the upcall. It does not remove it. NFSD accepts "rdma"
without a condition, so on a kernel that does not build svcrdma the name
still reaches request_module("svcrdma") under nfsd_mutex. That is
necessary for the modular case, where the autoload is legitimate.

Fixes: 16a471177496 ("NFSD: add listener-{set,get} netlink command")
Assisted-by: LLM
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c7eae0eb80858a2dba0f
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
index b6f4d66f612a..d8135f38e69f 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
@@ -1995,6 +1995,23 @@ int nfsd_nl_version_get_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	return err;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Transport classes NFSD knows how to instantiate. Vetting the name here
+ * keeps a bogus string from reaching svc_xprt_create_from_sa(), where an
+ * unknown name triggers a request_module("svc%s", name) upcall under
+ * nfsd_mutex.
+ */
+static bool nfsd_nl_transport_supported(const char *name)
+{
+	static const char * const supported[] = { "tcp", "udp", "rdma" };
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(supported); i++)
+		if (!strcmp(name, supported[i]))
+			return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* Upper bound on the number of listeners a single request may carry. */
 #define NFSD_NL_LISTENER_MAX	1024
 
@@ -2032,6 +2049,13 @@ static int nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(struct genl_info *info)
 		if (!tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR] || !tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME])
 			return -EINVAL;
 
+		if (!nfsd_nl_transport_supported(nla_data(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME]))) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(info->extack,
+					    tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME],
+					    "unsupported transport name");
+			return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+		}
+
 		sa = nla_data(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]);
 		if (nla_len(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]) < sizeof(sa->sa_family))
 			return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.55.0
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