Re: [PATCH net] net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: 2026-08-20 10:49:06
On 8/16/26 11:28 PM, Hyunwoo Kim wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
tcp_inbound_ao_hash() is called before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken, with only rcu_read_lock() held. On the fast path for established sockets, if the rnext_keyid sent by the peer differs from current_key->sndid, the key the peer asked for is looked up and stored in current_key. The lookup is inside the RCU read side, but current_key outlives it. When the socket is disconnected and connect() is called again for another peer, tcp_ao_connect_init() unlinks every key that does not match the new peer and frees it with call_rcu(). If current_key points at such a key, it is cleared to NULL. The fast path reads sk_state only once on entry, so a softirq that got into it while the socket was still established can update current_key after that loop has already run. The update is inside the RCU read side, so it comes before the call_rcu() callback, and once the callback frees the key, current_key is left pointing at freed memory. The next transmission picks that pointer up in tcp_get_current_key(). tcp_ao_transmit_skb() then reads the traffic key from the freed object, which is the use-after-free. Wait for one grace period before unlinking, and only if a key is going to be removed. By the time tcp_connect() runs the socket is already in TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_AO_ESTABLISHED does not contain TCPF_SYN_SENT, so a softirq entering after the wait cannot reach the fast path, and the ones already in it have finished. The existing NULL handling in the loop is then enough. Fixes: 0a3a809089eb ("net/tcp: Verify inbound TCP-AO signed segments") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <redacted> --- net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c index e4ec60a3349635..5094267447aee5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c@@ -1160,6 +1160,15 @@ void tcp_ao_connect_init(struct sock *sk) l3index = l3mdev_master_ifindex_by_index(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_bound_dev_if); + hlist_for_each_entry(key, &ao_info->head, node) { + if (tcp_ao_key_cmp(key, l3index, addr, key->prefixlen, + family, -1, -1)) { + /* pairs with tcp_inbound_ao_hash() */ + synchronize_rcu();
My understanding is that the above will rate-limit _only_ disconnect()/connect() sequences. Since the former op is basically evil, I think that the extremely severe constraint on it is acceptable. Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, next, &ao_info->head, node) {
if (!tcp_ao_key_cmp(key, l3index, addr, key->prefixlen, family, -1, -1))
continue;