Re: [PATCH net] sctp: fix possible out-of-bounds read in SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: 2026-08-18 15:14:45
Also in:
linux-sctp, lkml
On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 5:23 AM luoqing [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
From: Qing Luo <redacted> While processing SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES in sctp_process_param(), the length field is subtracted from sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) and stored in a __u16 variable. If the length is less than sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) (4 bytes), the unsigned subtraction underflows, resulting in a value near 0xFFFF. The subsequent for() loop then iterates far beyond the parameter boundaries, causing an out-of-bounds read. sctp_verify_param() performs no length validation for this parameter type, so a malformed parameter with insufficient length can reach sctp_process_param() through the INIT/INIT-ACK/COOKIE-ECHO processing path. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <redacted> --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 236e25abc7a4..ebf791969454 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c@@ -2169,12 +2169,19 @@ static enum sctp_ierror sctp_verify_param(struct net *net, case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS: case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS: case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE: - case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES: case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE: case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO: case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS: case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE: break; + + case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES: + if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) { + sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, + chunk, err_chunk); + retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT; + } + break; case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND: if (ntohs(param.p->length) != sizeof(*param.aind)) { sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,@@ -2600,6 +2607,9 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1; /* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */ + if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + break; + sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr); if (sat) sat /= sizeof(__u16); --2.25.1
This is not necessary. Please check sctp_walk_params(), and I think it's already validated this for all params: ntohs(pos.p->length) >= sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) Thanks.