[PATCH net 0/2] inetpeer: harden tree sizing and address side-channel eviction

This series addresses a vulnerability in the inetpeer subsystem where an
off-path adversary can manipulate garbage collection to bypass IP-keyed
ICMP rate limits, and hardens inetpeer memory usage under pressure.

The inetpeer rate limiting system stores peer entries in an RB-tree keyed
deterministically by remote IP address. Because tree lookups walk the
tree using lexicographical comparison (inetpeer_addr_cmp), an off-path
attacker can predict the tree topology and the exact sequence of nodes
traversed during lookups (the gc_stack candidate list). By combining
predictable traversal with aggressive garbage collection triggered when
the tree size exceeds inet_peer_threshold, an attacker can selectively
force the eviction of targeted inet_peer nodes. When an evicted node is
recreated on the next packet, its rate-limiting token bucket is reset to
full capacity, creating a side-channel to bypass ICMP rate limits and
probe for open UDP ports.

- Patch 1 enforces a hard limit on inet_peer allocations at 2x
  inet_peer_threshold to prevent unbounded slab memory growth if GC
  cannot free entries, and ensures inet_peer_xrlim_allow() fails closed
  (returns false) if peer allocation fails and returns NULL.

- Patch 2 randomizes RB-tree node ordering using SipHash with a secret
  boot-time key (inetpeer_hash_key), making tree layout and GC eviction
  paths unpredictable to off-path attackers.

Reported-by: Michael Blunt <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

Eric Dumazet (2):
  inetpeer: enforce hard limit on tree size and fix NULL peer rate limit
  inetpeer: randomize RB-tree node comparison using SipHash

 include/net/inetpeer.h |  4 ++++
 net/ipv4/inetpeer.c    | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

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