[PATCH v16 03/10] tls: reject rekey attempts on an existing HW-offloaded connection
From: Rishikesh Jethwani <hidden>
Date: 2026-08-07 18:40:15
Subsystem:
networking [general], networking [tls], the rest · Maintainers:
"David S. Miller", Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, John Fastabend, Sabrina Dubroca, Linus Torvalds
On a TLS 1.3 rekey, do_tls_setsockopt_conf() must not dispatch to
tls_set_device_offload{,_rx}(): reject the rekey with -EOPNOTSUPP for a
HW-offloaded connection (HW KeyUpdate is not supported yet, and we must
not fall back to software mid-connection), and for a SW-offloaded one
re-init the software crypto state via tls_set_sw_offload() directly.
Prep for the following patch ("tls: add TLS 1.3 hardware offload
support"), which drops the TLS_1_2_VERSION guards in those helpers.
Those guards currently also reject a (TLS 1.3) rekey; once gone, a rekey
reaching tls_set_device_offload_rx(),which has no other early guard,
would set up a brand-new device offload instead of a key update.
Signed-off-by: Rishikesh Jethwani <redacted>
---
net/tls/tls_main.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
index fbb274287aa5..a62e94508c8b 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c@@ -710,49 +710,64 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, } if (tx) { - rc = tls_set_device_offload(sk); - conf = TLS_HW; - if (!rc) { - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXDEVICE); - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXDEVICE); - } else { - rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 1, - update ? crypto_info : NULL); - if (rc) - goto err_crypto_info; - - if (update) { - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXREKEYOK); - } else { - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXSW); - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXSW); + if (update && ctx->tx_conf == TLS_HW) { + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto err_crypto_info; + } + + if (!update) { + rc = tls_set_device_offload(sk); + conf = TLS_HW; + if (!rc) { + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXDEVICE); + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXDEVICE); + goto out; } - conf = TLS_SW; } - } else { - rc = tls_set_device_offload_rx(sk, ctx); - conf = TLS_HW; - if (!rc) { - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXDEVICE); - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXDEVICE); + + rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 1, update ? crypto_info : NULL); + if (rc) + goto err_crypto_info; + + if (update) { + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXREKEYOK); } else { - rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0, - update ? crypto_info : NULL); - if (rc) - goto err_crypto_info; - - if (update) { - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYOK); - } else { - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXSW); - TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXSW); + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXSW); + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXSW); + } + conf = TLS_SW; + } else { + if (update && ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW) { + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto err_crypto_info; + } + + if (!update) { + rc = tls_set_device_offload_rx(sk, ctx); + conf = TLS_HW; + if (!rc) { + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXDEVICE); + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXDEVICE); + tls_sw_strparser_arm(sk, ctx); + goto out; } - conf = TLS_SW; } - if (!update) + + rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0, update ? crypto_info : NULL); + if (rc) + goto err_crypto_info; + + if (update) { + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYOK); + } else { + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXSW); + TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXSW); tls_sw_strparser_arm(sk, ctx); + } + conf = TLS_SW; } +out: if (tx) ctx->tx_conf = conf; else
--
2.25.1