[PATCH net] tls: fix RX desync on overlapping skbs
From: Maximilian Immanuel Brandtner <hidden>
Date: 2026-08-07 17:35:47
Subsystem:
networking [general], networking [tls], the rest · Maintainers:
"David S. Miller", Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, John Fastabend, Sabrina Dubroca, Linus Torvalds
On a reordering path (e.g. IPsec crypto offload + GRO) the TCP receive
queue can hold adjacent skbs whose sequence ranges overlap. The tls
fast-path reads the record header with skb_copy_bits() by byte offset,
which assumes skb ranges don't overlap.
When a record boundary lands within the last few bytes of an skb, the
5-byte header straddles into the overlapping next skb; the duplicate bytes
are read as the header, yielding a bogus length (-EMSGSIZE) or version
(-EINVAL) and aborting the connection.
tls_strp_check_queue_ok() already detects such overlaps and diverts to the
seq-addressed copy path, but it only ran after the header was parsed, and
it validated stm.offset + stm.full_len -- and full_len is still 0 for a new
record, so it could not cover the header bytes. Parameterize it by length
and also validate the header region (stm.offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE) before
parsing.
Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Immanuel Brandtner <redacted>
---
Tested on Linux kernel 7.2 rc6
---
net/tls/tls_strp.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_strp.c b/net/tls/tls_strp.c
index 61b10c697ecc..64d5dea90540 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_strp.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_strp.c@@ -430,9 +430,9 @@ static int tls_strp_read_copy(struct tls_strparser *strp, bool qshort) return 0; } -static bool tls_strp_check_queue_ok(struct tls_strparser *strp) +static bool tls_strp_check_queue_ok(struct tls_strparser *strp, + unsigned int len) { - unsigned int len = strp->stm.offset + strp->stm.full_len; struct sk_buff *first, *skb; u32 seq;
@@ -525,6 +525,12 @@ static int tls_strp_read_sock(struct tls_strparser *strp) tls_strp_load_anchor_with_queue(strp, inq); if (!strp->stm.full_len) { + if (inq < TLS_HEADER_SIZE) + return tls_strp_read_copy(strp, true); + + if (!tls_strp_check_queue_ok(strp, strp->stm.offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE)) + return tls_strp_read_copy(strp, false); + sz = tls_rx_msg_size(strp, strp->anchor); if (sz < 0) return sz;
@@ -535,7 +541,7 @@ static int tls_strp_read_sock(struct tls_strparser *strp) return tls_strp_read_copy(strp, true); } - if (!tls_strp_check_queue_ok(strp)) + if (!tls_strp_check_queue_ok(strp, strp->stm.offset + strp->stm.full_len)) return tls_strp_read_copy(strp, false); WRITE_ONCE(strp->msg_ready, 1);
--
2.55.0