Re: [PATCH] net: inet: prevent lhash2 lookups from escaping into ehash
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Date: 2026-08-04 01:53:51
Also in:
lkml
Subsystem:
networking [general], networking [tcp], the rest · Maintainers:
"David S. Miller", Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Neal Cardwell, Linus Torvalds
From: David Lee <redacted> Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 14:05:12 +0000
The lhash2 and ehash tables share sk_nulls_node. When a listening socket is unhashed and rehashed as a connected socket
This is only fuzzing scenario, and there is another series trying to address the same class of issue by touching the fast path as well. https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260803-sockmap-lookup-tcp-leak-v2-0-306e025bfe66@rbox.co/ (local)
while an RCU
listener lookup is walking it, the reader can follow the node's new
next pointer into ehash. inet_lhash2_lookup() and
inet6_lhash2_lookup() do not validate the terminal nulls marker, so
they can return an ehash entry under the listener lookup's
unreferenced ownership contract.
In particular, returning a TIME_WAIT socket makes the TCP receive
path consume a reference that the lookup never acquired. Repeated
races can free the object while it remains linked in the hash tables.
Skip non-listening sockets before scoring them. Also restart the walk
when its terminal nulls marker does not match the expected lhash2 slot,
as the established lookup already does.
Fixes: cae3873c5b3a ("net: inet: Retire port only listening_hash")
Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and
validated by Trail of Bits.
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol gpt-5.5-cyber
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <redacted>
---
Trail of Bits has a reproducer for this bug that triggers a
KASAN use-after-free and can share if needed.Can you test this diff ? ---8<---
diff --git a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h
index 433c2df23076..903499581db7 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ struct inet_connection_sock { u32 icsk_rto_max; __u32 icsk_delack_max; __u32 icsk_pmtu_cookie; + unsigned char unhashed_state; const struct tcp_congestion_ops *icsk_ca_ops; const struct inet_connection_sock_af_ops *icsk_af_ops; const struct tcp_ulp_ops *icsk_ulp_ops;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index ba0faa9ae2bb..3ed8d5833c3b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c@@ -803,6 +803,14 @@ int inet_hash(struct sock *sk) inet_init_ehash_secret(); WARN_ON(!sk_unhashed(sk)); + + if (unlikely(inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state)) { + if (inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state != TCP_LISTEN) + synchronize_rcu(); + + inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state = 0; + } + ilb2 = inet_lhash2_bucket_sk(hashinfo, sk); spin_lock(&ilb2->lock);
@@ -832,6 +840,9 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk) return; sock_rps_delete_flow(sk); + + inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state = sk->sk_state; + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb2;
@@ -1058,6 +1069,13 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, int ret, i, low, high; bool local_ports; + if (unlikely(inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state)) { + if (inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state == TCP_LISTEN) + synchronize_rcu(); + + inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state = 0; + } + if (port) { local_bh_disable(); ret = check_established(death_row, sk, port, NULL, false, ---8<---